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Announcement in Police Entries
Two recently enacted federal statutes give police the power to enter
dwellings unannounced to search and arrest. Such "no-knock" powers
supersede the rule that law officers must pause at the threshold to re-
quest admittance and to state their identity and their purpose.1
Though a number of states permit no-knock entries in certain excep-
tional circumstances,2 the first federally sponsored no-knock legislation
was the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act of 1970.3 In addition, the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 pro-
vides no-knock search powers for federal narcotics agents operating
nationwide.4
This federal interest in no-knock legislation is significant not solely
because District of Columbia police and federal narcotics agents will
possess another investigative technique. The attention generated by
federal approval of no-knock makes it likely that those states which
already sanction such powers will use them more frequently and that
other states will seriously consider passing their own no-knock statutes.
Federal experience with no-knock in the narcotics field may also
suggest systematic use of these powers in other areas of law enforcement.
As the right of unannounced police entry is increasingly exercised,
the Fourth Amendment rules of announcement will be invoked by
those challenging the constitutionality of expanded no-knock powers.
After examining the purposes announcement served at common law,
this Note will develop a framework with which to identify those
limited situations when, under the Fourth Amendment, announce-
ment may reasonably be abrogated. This framework will be used to
evaluate the recent federal no-knock legislation. These no-knock pow-
ers, it will be shown, are overbroad and, unless carefully restricted,
seriously undermine the constitutional guarantees of the Fourth
Amendment.
1. This is the procedure that applies to most entrances. See pp. 146-47 infra. There are
qualifications to the rule, however. See pp. 147-48 infra.
2. For a short summary of the law in each state see Sonnenreich and Ebner, No-Knock
and Non-Sense, an Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. J. L. REv. 626, 654-59 (1970);
Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawful Entry: Miller v. United States and
Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499, 560-61 (1964).
3. D.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-521 to 522, 84 Stat. 473, Pub. L. No. 91-358 § 210 (July 29,
1970) [hereinafter cited as D.C. Criminal Procedure Act].
4. 84 Stat. 1236, Pub. L. No. 91-518 § 509(b) (Oct. 27, 1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970
Drug Act].
139
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 80: 139, 1970
I. History of the Announcement Rule
A. Purposes
As a defined legal system gTadually replaced self-help remedies in me-
dieval England, announcement before entering premises to seize chattels
developed as a means of decreasing the potential for violence.5 The vio-
lence to be avoided was that committed either by the possessor, legally
entitled to defend his possession, or by the person seeking possession.,
As the right to regain goods was gradually circumscribed and the right
to defend property given greater weight, limitations on the right of an
outsider to enter land and dwellings were formalized.7 Though greater
reliance subsequently was placed on official action to retake stolen
goods," the requirement of announcement was enforced against entries
by public officers as well. It became necessary for a public official seek-
ing stolen goods to identify himself and his mission, or risk being guilty
5. Announcement requirements had probably played a similar role in earlier societies
where the monopolization of violence by the state had taken place. Biblical law had
prohibited a creditor from entering his debtor's house to obtain security for the debt.
DEUTERONOMY 24:10. In ancient Rome a person searching for stolen goods had the follow-
ing means of publicizing his purpose. After specifically describing the goods he was
seeking, he could search, in the presence of witnesses, the house where the goods were
thought to be. He was accompanied by a bailiff of the court, who was his legal authority,
and a public crier who proclaimed the theft of the various articles. Any person whose
house was searched would thus have due notice of the event and its purpose. Notice
having been given, the searcher could have his slave break doors if necessary. N. LAssoN,
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CON-
sTrrUTiON 17-18 (1937) [hereinafter cited as LASSON]. When law's authority expanded, the
prohibitions against asserting one's own rights by force became more frequent and de-
tailed. 3 W. HoLuswom', A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 278 (1966). For example, by the
thirteenth century a man who retook goods by force committed a trespass and ran the
risk of being treated as a thief. Id. at 279. Possession was given legal protection, not be-
cause of the prossessor's intrinsic merits, but because "to allow men to make forcible entries
on land or to seize goods without form of law is to invite violence." 2 F. POLLOCK & F.
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAw 41 (2d ed. reissued 1968).
6. The origins of the necessity of self-identification by one seeking stolen goods
can be seen in the ancient action for the recovery of such goods. This action was aimed
at the punishment of the thief as well as recovery of the stolen articles. The search was
conducted by the victim of the crime before any proceedings took place in a court of law.
If cattle were stolen, he would follow the trail leading onto a man's land where he seized
and claimed the animal. He then declared it to be his and called upon the incumbent
possessor to state his title. If the possessor also claimed the beast both claimants appeared
in court. The intruder on the property had to state his reason for being there.
2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, supra note 5, at 157-58, 168.
7. For example, the crime of hamsocn, literally, "home-breaking," the forcible entry
into a man's dwelling, was punished severely in the tenth century. It was justifiable to
kill anyone committing the crime without the usual payment of compensation to
his family. LASSON at 19. At the end of the fifteenth century peaceable recapture
of stolen goods was allowed; and it was lawful for this purpose to enter upon the land of
the person who had wrongfully taken the goods but not break into his house. Y.B.B. 9
Ed. IV., Mich. pl. 10; 21 Hy. VII. Hil. pl. 18, noted in W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 5,
at 279.
8. W. HoLDSWORTHr, supra note 5, at 598. This development occurred gradually and
was not yet complete by the latter 16th century.
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of a crime as well as subject to legitimate attack.9 Declaration of iden-
tity and purpose by both citizens and officials was thus one aspect of
the community's effort to impose public order.
A second purpose of announcement prior to entrance for search or
arrest was protection of privacy. An unexpected intrusion by a private
party came to be regarded as an invasion of a man's privacy and there-
fore a tortious assault.' 0 This reasoning was extended to incursions by
public officers, so that their unannounced entrance was also regarded
as an infringement of privacy.'1 Semayne's Case,12 the leading decision
requiring announcement before entry in the execution of a warrant,
9. In Ratcliffe v. Burton, a case where an officer with an arrest warrant broke inner
doors of a dwelling without demand for admittance after entering peacefully through the
outer door, Justice Heath commented: "Such conduct must tend to create fear and dismay,
and breaches of the peace by provoking resistance." 3 Bos. and Pul. 223, 230, 127 Eng.
Rep. 123, 126 (C.P. 1802). Justice Heath also observed that the absence of notice
would not only be attended with great mischief to the persons against whom process
is issued, but to other persons also, since it must equally hold good in cases of process
upon escape, where the party has taken refuge in the house of a stranger. Shall it
be said that in such a case the officer may break open the outer door of a stranger's
house without declaring the authority under which he acts, or making any demand
for admittance?
Id. at 230, 127. Justice Rook saw that demand for entry would also remove the need for
violence on the part of the officers: "What a privilege will be allowed to sheriff's officers if
they are permitted to effect their search by violence, without making that demand which
possibly will be complied with, and consequently violence be rendered unnecessaryl" Id.
Launocl v. Brown was one of the first cases specifically concerning a search warrant. When
the warrant for guns illegally used in game poaching was executed without a request of
admission, it was asked:
[f no previous demand is made, how is it possible for a party to know what the
object of the person breaking open the door may be? He has a right to consider it
as an aggression on his private property, which he will be justified in resisting to the
utmost. 2 B. & Aid. 592, 594, 106 Eng. Rep. 482, 483 (K.B. 1819).
10. This regard for privacy grew out of the protection of possession: "The possessor's
possession is protected, not indeed because he has any sort or right in the thing, blit
because in general one cannot disturb his possession without being guilty, or almost
guilty, of some injury to his person, some act which, if it does not amount to an assault,
comes so dangerously near to an assault that it can be regarded as an invasion of that
sphere of peace and quiet which the law should guarantee to every one of its subjects."
2 F. POLLocK g: F. MArrLAND, supra note 5, at 41-42. In Rogers v. Spence, 13 Meeson and
Welsby 571, 581 (Ex. 1844), the court said: "These rights of action are given in respect of
the immediate and present violation ... of possession independently . . . of rights of
property. ...."
11. See, e.g., Semayne's Case, discussed p. 143 infra. In Waterhouse v. Saltmarsh the
sheriff, executing a civil warrant, entered an open outer door and climbed the stairs to a
locked bedroom door. Though his party knocked on the door, "without telling what they
were, or wherefore they came," the sheriff and his aides broke open the door. The Star-
Chamber fined the sheriff for "the unnecessary terror and outrage and terror of this
arrest, and for not signifying that he was the sheriff, that the door might have been
opened without violence .... " Hob. 263, 264, 80 Eng. Rep. 409 (K.B. 1724). Cf. Penton
v. Brown, 1 Keble 668, 83 Eng. Rep. 1193 (1664), where the breaking of barn doors
without request for admission was upheld because the barn was not part of the dwelling.
Such a distinction between house and barn points up the function of supporting the right
of privacy served by the announcement rule.
12. 5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1603). This case is more fully discussed at p. 143
infra. The fact that the warrant in Semayne's Case was civil made it easier for the court
to find an incursion on privacy since the state interest in its execution was less. See also
Park v. Evans, Hob. 62, 80 Eng. Rep. 211 (K.B. 1724).
141
The Yale Law Journal
contained an early expression of this rationale: "[T]he house of every
one is to him as his castle and fortress as well as his defense against
violence as for his repose . . .,"I
A third purpose of the announcement requirement was to prevent
the physicial destruction of property. Such destruction would leave the
home open to attack from the street. In seventeenth century England,
doors and window shutters could not be easily replaced, and, if dam-
aged, they could not shield the homeowner from the severe dangers
outside.14 A request for entrance by an official obviously gave the prop-
erty owner the opportunity to prevent his bulwark of safety from being
destroyed.
B. English Experience
By 1791 the need for notice before officials could forcibly enter was
firmly established in England.15 The announcement rule was first
13. 5 Co. Rep. 91b, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (K.B. 1603). The man's home is his castle
theme has received endless repetition, perhaps most eloquently by William Pitt, in a
Parliamentary debate on searches to enforce an excise on cider: "The poorest man may
in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may
shake; the wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; but the King of England
cannot enter-all his force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenementi" Quoted
in Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 801, 307 (1958). Picturesque as it is, this statement
was never really true. It was early held that doors to a dwelling could be broken by
royal officials upon proper demand. Semayne's Case was one of the precedents for this
doctrine. See p. 148 infra.
14. When the court in Semayne's Case stated that the home was a defense against
violence, it presumably meant violence primarily from thieves and marauders.
Semayne's Case held that though the sheriff could not break doors to do execution on
the body or goods of a debtor (a civil execution), he could enter if the door was open.
This holding can only be justified if the intact preservation of the door is regarded as a
purpose of the announcement rule. The sheriff's entrance when the door was open would
obviously not expose the homeowner to the threat of outside violence any more than he
was already. See also, Ryan v. Shiloch, 7 Ex. 70, 155 Eng. Rep. 861 (1851). Similarly,
destruction of inner doors would not remove protection against invasion from the street
and was therefore not privileged. Hutcheson v. Burch, 4 Taunt 619, 128 Eng. Rep. 473
(C.P. 1812); but see Ratciiffe v. Burton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 228, 127 Eng. Rep. 128 (C.P. 1802).
In the 1774 case of Lee v. Gansel a bailiff had broken open an inner door after he gave
notice of his presence. Lord Mansfield gave the following rationale for the rule against
breaking doors or windows in the execution of warrants:
The ground of this; that otherwise the consequences would be fatal for it would
leave the family within, naked and exposed to thieves and robbers. It is much better
therefore, says the law, that you should wait for another opportunity, than do an
act of violence, which may probably be attended with such dangerous consequences.
1 Cowp. 1, 6, 98 Eng. Rep. 985, 988 (1774).
Breaking of entrances at night was particularly shunned, since it left the inhabitants
vulnerable at the time of greatest danger. See Foster v. Holl, I Bulstrode 146, 80 Eng. Rep.
889 (1640). Even where demand for admission was properly made, the destruction of doors
and windows was unlawful in many instances, such as execution of civil process, because
the law sought to avoid the greater evil. See Cook's Case, Cro. Car. 587, 79 Eng. Rep. 1063
(K.B. 1640).
15. Because of the stress placed on physical integrity of a home's passages to the out.
side, there was much discussion in cases and commentary of conditions allowing a door to
be broken to execute a warrant or to make an arrest without a warrant, but these dis-
cussions presumed that when doors could be broken it was only after announcement. For
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stated in Semayne's Case'8 in 1608; although the case involved execu-
tion of a civil writ, the court said, in dicta:
In all cases when the King is a party, the sheriff (if the doors be
not open) may break the party's house, either to arrest him, or to
do execution of the King's process, if otherwise he cannot enter.
But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his com-
ing, and to make request to open the doors ....17
Announcement thus came to include a statement of identity and pur-
pose by the executing officer' 8 and exceptions to announcement were
severely limited. 9 Notice was required both in arrests and searches.20
summaries of the circumstances justifying the breaking of a door to effect a search or
arrest, see Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307-8 (1958); Accarino v. United States,
179 F.2d 456, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1949); Blakey, supra note 2, at 502-4; Thomas, The Execution
of Warrants of Arrest, CRim. L. Rxv. 520, 597, 601-4 (1962); Wilgus, Arrest Without a
Warrant, 22 MICH. L. REv. 798, 802 (1924); 1 CHITrY, CRIMINAL LAW 53, 56, 57, 66 (1832);
2 HALE, PLEaAs ov mm CROwN 107, 116, 149-52 (1778).
Not all warrants legally justified the breaking of doors at all, even with proper notice.
E.g., Semayne's Case, supra note 12, put forth the distinction between breaking into a
house to execute a warrant at the suit of an individual, which was impermissible, and
executing a warrant used in connection with criminal proceedings which, in dicta, was
held permissible. Notice was especially important since a homeowner who was given notice
of an attempted execution of certain writs could lawfully refuse to open his door and the
official could not legally break it down. See Park v. Evans, Hob. 62, 80 Eng. Rep. 211
(1724).
16. Supra note 12. Thus, though the occasions which would permit the breaking of
doors were a matter of controversy, it was held that when doors could be broken, it was
only after notice was given.
17. 5 Co. Rep. at 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. at 195 (K.B. 1603). Though Semayne's Case involved
the execution of a civil writ, it has been widely cited for the manner of execution of
criminal process. See, e.g., Burdett v. Abbot, 14 East 1, 157, 162, 104 Eng. Rep. 501, 561,
563 (1811).
18. In 1756 in the Case of Richard Curtis, Fost. 135, 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (1757) the
majority held that although no precise form of words was required, the party had a right
to be given notice that the officer came not as a trespasser, but claiming to act under
proper authority. The minority would have required an even stricter rule, that the officers
declare in an explicit manner the nature of their warrants.
19. See notes 88 and 90 infra.
20. See, e.g., Semayne's Case, supra note 12. See also Blakey, supra note 2, at 502-04;
Thomas, supra note 15, at 520, 597, 601-04.
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries search warrants were used for blatantly
political purposes, such as seizing an opponent's papers, and were the subject of public
attention and outrage. Cf. LASSON at 43-48. Every detail of these warrants was under public
scrutiny and complaints about their lack of specificity in naming the persons or things to
be seized, the absence of oath or probable cause, and their often unlimited duration were
common. See generally LAssoN at 23-50. In this atmosphere, the absence of complaints
about silent entries by victims of these intrusions, who were quick to criticize other aspects
of the warrants, strongly implies that announcement was given. It is possible that failings
in announcement were overshadowed by other outrages of the writs, but it is more likely
that the warrants were served with announcement.
There is strong evidence that notice was observed in the execution of search warrants.
Contemporary commentary on the warrants' execution declared that officers could break
doors to search for stolen goods if their demand for admittance was first refused, neces-
sarily implying that announcement was customarily given: "If the door be shut and upon
demand it be refused to be opened by them within, if the stolen goods be in the house,
the officer may break open the door . . .. " 2 HALE, supra note 15, at 151. Hale else-
where contended that no doors could be broken in a general search for stolen goods. Id.
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Efforts to legislate no-knock authorization were repeatedly resisted in
the eighteenth century,21 despite the fact that such powers were pro-
posed as a means of increasing police effectiveness. 22
C. American Experience Before 1789
American colonial experience with announcement prior to entrance
was parallel to England's: execution of all warrants was made with no-
tice. There are no reported cases in America before 1791 discussing ex-
ceptions to announcement. 23 This was true even for writs of assistance,
broad search warrants which were used to enforce the Navigation Acts
and which elicited strong colonial opposition.24 The legislation cre-
at 116. "With respect to the mode of executing this [search] warrant, if the door be shut,
and, upon demand, not opened, it may be broken open .... 1 CEurrY, supra note 15, at
66 (emphasis added).
In a seventeenth century attack on the excise tax and the searches enforcing it, an
anonymous polemicist noted, in passing, that government officials had to request ad-
mission before executing their otherwise unlimited warrants: "Officers . . . upon every
suspicion, and often malicious information, come into our houses, with armed men, and
if not immediately let in, violently break open our doors, to the great affrightment and
amazement of our wives, children and families." Anon., Excise Anatomiz'd 15 (1659,
1733 ed.) quoted in LASSON at 34 n.77 (emphasis added). Even writs of assistance em-
powered the breaking open of doors, chests or packages only if resistance was met, a con-
dition that strongly implies that some type of identification was given. See note 25 infra.
21. English parliamentary legislation prior to the Bill of Rights in the United States
in 1791, prohibited entry into buildings without announcement. Such legislation made
clear Parliament's accordance with the rudimentary judicial doctrine of announcement.
The 1757 bill for controlling pawnbrokers empowered justices to issue search warrants
for pawned contraband, but constables executing the warrants could forcibly enter homes
only if they were refused admittance. 30 Geo. 2, c. 24 (1757), discussed in 3 L. RAozINOWsCZ,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRMINAL LAw 79 (1966). The London and Westminster Police
Bill of 1785 would have permitted the breaking of doors to make searches, seemingly
without announcement, and its defeat reflected opposition to such governmental power.
Search warrants issued under the proposed bill would have authorized the police to enter
or break into any premises to search for stolen goods, or to seize vagabonds, receivers,
felons or their accomplices. Many of the most heated objections to the bill were voiced
against the broadened police powers of search and entry. Id. at 109, 114.
22. In fact, the rule of announcement was so firmly entrenched in England by the
latter part of the eighteenth century, that the proposal by a noted jurist of no-knock
powers for police was seen as a radical innovation. In 1795, Patrick Culquhoun published
his Treatise on Police, proposing, as part of a general widening of police search powers,
that the police be enabled to search buildings at night and suddenly to force open doors
or windows. A TREATISE ON THE POLICE OF THE METROPOLIS EXPLAINING THE VARIOUS
CRIMES 'WHICH AT PRESENT ARE FELT AS A PRESSURE UPON THE COMIUNITY; AND SUGGESTING
REMEDIES FOR THEIR PREVENTION, BY A MAGISTRATE 202-03 (1795), quoted in 3 RADzINowIcz
supra note, 21 at 272. That this scheme was presented in a program of reform and
innovation in 1795 would certainly suggest that the police in England did not at the time
have the discretion to make no-knock entries. In the years immediately before 1791, then,
search without announcement was not countenanced, despite repeated attempts to broaden
search powers to include it.
23. The earliest case found by Sonnenreich and Ebner, supra note 2, at 629, was Read
v. Case, 4 Conn. 166 (1822) discussed at note 88 infra.
24. Writs of assistance were first authorized by the Act of Charles II of 1662 which
empowered the Court of Exchequer to issue the writs to search for uncustomed or pro-
hibited goods. 13-14 Charles 11, c.11, § V (1662); LASSON at 53. The writs received their
name from the fact that they commanded all British subjects to assist in their execution.
LAssoN at 53-54.
0. DICKERSON, THE NAVIGATION ACTS AND THE AmEmCAN REVOLUTION (1951) contends
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ating the writs required that notice be given before entry was made,28
and reported instances of its use included notice.26 The colonists,
acutely sensitive to intrusions under the writs, did not list absence of
announcement among their complaints. 27 Searches under the writs had
an immediate impact in sparking the Revolution,28 and the draftsmen
of the Bill of Rights were certainly familiar with them. It is fair to as-
sume that the framers did not consider any arrest or search to be rea-
sonable that did not include the level of announcement present even
in the hated writs of assistance. 29
that the manner of enforcing the revenue acts, and not merely the acts themselves, was
responsible for the change in attitude by many colonists which produced the Revolution.
Dickerson states that England's mercantilist policies contributed to the growth and
prosperity of the colonies, and, for the most part, did not stifle the expansion of American
industry and agriculture. The colonists, aware of their favorable position, did little to
evade or abolish these trade laws. When the economic regulations were transformed into
revenue raising devices, with the intrusions on personal property rights incumbent on
their enforcement, opposition to the British presence mushroomed. This new policy of
taxation and exploitation which replaced England's protective benevolence, in the interest
of a political faction in England, disintegrated colonial loyalty. "The evidence indicates
that it was the use made of the incidental provisions of [the revenue acts] to attack
fundamentally the liberty and property of Americans that in six short years transformed
thousands of loyal British subjects into active revolutionists." Id. at 208, 290-300 and
passim.
See also Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 159 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); 10
ADAMs, WoRKs 247; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-25 (1886); Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (opinion of Brennan, J.).
25. The act creating the writs of assistance granted the right of forcible entry to a
customs official carrying a writ. He could take a constable or other civil official with him
in the daytime to "enter and go into any house, shop, cellar, warehouse or room or
other place, and in case of resistance, to break open doors, chests, trunks and other pack-
ages, there to seize and from thence to bring, any kind of goods or merchandise whatso-
ever, prohibited and uncustomed." 13-14 Charles II, c. II, c. 11 §§ IV, V; made applicable to
colonies: 7-8 William II, c. 22 § VI (1696) (emphasis added).
26. There are no reported cases of forcible entries where demand was not made. For
example, an attempt by a customs official in 1774 to enforce the revenue laws against
trade between the colonies of Delaware and Maryland, through searches for uncustomed
goods, was preceded by a demand to comply "in the name of the law." DIcKERSoN, supra
note 24, at 252.
When James Otis argued against writs of assistance in Superior Court in Massachusetts
in 1761 he alluded with distaste to the power of customhouse officials to force entry to
houses. See H. MILLER, THE CASE FOR LIBERTY 130-33 (1965); 2 C. ADAMs, THE LIFE AND
WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 523-25 (1850); LAssON at 58-60. In John Adams' account of the
speech, Otis said, "Customhouse officers may enter our houses, when they please; we are
commanded to permit the entry." C. AmAuis, supra, at 524 (emphasis added). It appears,
then, that execution of writs of assistance in the American colonies necessitated the same
prior announcement by the customs officials as their execution in England.
27. Cf. LASSON at 54.
28. See note 24 supra.
29. Though neither state nor federal constitutional search provisions nor the debates
about them speak of the manner in which warrants shall be executed, it would be un-
reasonable to assume that the standard would be any less than that for the general
warrants and writs of assistance which the newly independent Americans were abolishing.
In response to the perceived injustices of the writs, beginning with the Virginia Bill of
Rights in 1776, seven states passed constitutional provisions dealing with the government
power to effect searches. LAssoN at 82. These declarations were aimed, in more or less
specific terms, at the activities of the British before the Revolution. Thus, some states
explicitly prohibited general warrants while others did so in effect by outlawing warrants
issued without oath and without specification of the persons or objects to be searched or
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II. The Requirement of Announcement and Its Exceptions
A diverse body of state common law was created subsequent to
ratification of the Bill of Rights, often producing exceptions to
the announcement rule.30 To rationalize this conflicting law, the Su-
preme Court, in the 1963 case of Ker v. California, held that the Fourth
Amendment incorporated the rule of announcement as an essential
element of a reasonable search.3 ' The Court in Ker also held, however,
that in certain circumstances the Constitution may not require an-
nouncement. 32 The eight Justices who adopted the announcement rule
as a constitutional prerequisite to police entrances split four-four over
the type of finding that would justify abandonment of notice.33 There
have been no Supreme Court decisions since Ker dealing with the con-
stitutionality of the announcement rule and its exceptions. 84
seized and without a limited duration. LASSON at 79-82. Lack of announcement was not
spedfically dealt with because there were not exceptions to announcement in the colonial
period. For the Court's practice of looking at the colonial experience to interpret the
Fourth Amendment see p. 154 infra.
30. See discussion of California law, at pp. 160-62 infra, as an example. See also Blakey,
supra note 2, at 509 n.84; Sonnenreich and Ebner, supra note 2, at 654-59. A table of the
status of the law of announcement, statutory and judicial, in the fifty states appears id.
at 654-59. The majority of the state decisions do not allude to the Fourth Amendment
problems inherent in state, as well as federal, police entries since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961), made the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states, and will not be discussed
here. The Court's decision in Mapp generated a stream of cases testing state common law
by constitutional standards, leading to consideration of Ker. See N. SOBEL, CuREr
PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF SEAnCH AND SEiZURE 7 (1964).
31. 374 U.S. 23, 37, 47. Lawful entry had been held to be an indispensable predicate
of a reasonable search in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1920). In that case a
business acquaintance had been invited into Gouled's office, where he seized papers with-
out a warrant when Gouled left the room.
Ker concerned California's interpretation of the common law requirement of notice
before entrance. People v. Ker, 195 Cal. App. 2d 246, 15 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1961). Police
officers had observed a man, driving a car registered in George Ker's name, meeting
with a known marijuana dealer. The officers followed the suspect from the meeting but
lost him when he made a U-turn in the middle of the block. Discovering that Ker was
the registered owner of the car and having information that he had purchased marijuana
previously, the police went to his address, where they obtained a passkey from the man-
ager. Without knocking or giving notice, an officer opened the door with the key and
entered. George Ker was sitting in the living room and his wife was in the kitchen,
where the officer soon found more than two pounds of marijuana.
32. 374 U.S. 23, 37-44, 47-64. See pp. 147-48 infra.
33. Justice Harlan, the ninth Justice, contended that the Fourth Amendment did not
apply to the states as it did to the federal government. Judging the entry by Fourteenth
Amendment concepts of "fundamental fairness," he found it valid. 374 U.S. at 44-46.
The resulting five-four decision upheld the Ker's conviction, affirming the lower court.
34. On two other occasions the Court has decided cases on announcement, but both
have been based on interpretations of the federal common law. In Miller v. United
States, 857 U.S. 301 (1958), the Court required announcement in arrests without a
warrant, following the federal statutory provision of 18 US.C. § 3109 (1948), that demands
announcement in execution of search warrants. It noted, however, as a reason for its
decision to extend the protections of § 3109 to arrests without warrant that "(tlhe
requirement of prior notice of authority and purpose before forcing entry into a home
is deeply rooted in our heritage and should not be given grudging application," and
that such a requirement was "embedded in Anglo-American law." Id. at 313. In Sabbath
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A. The Elements of Announcement
From Ker and from other cases, three elements have emerged as nec-
essary to a proper police announcement prior to entry: (1) notice of
presence in the form of knocking or ringing the doorbell; (2) identifi-
cation of authority as law enforcement officers; (3) statement of lawful
purpose. The Supreme Court has clearly indicated that all three of these
elements must be present to constitute proper announcement. Sabbath
v. United States 5 affirmed the need for an indication of police presence
prior to entry. In Miller v. United States,36 officers stated "police" in a
low voice, then immediately burst into the dwelling. The Court held
that they should have declared their purpose and requested admission.
Thus it is not proper for the officers to assume that because their pres-
ence is known, their obligation to announce their purpose is elimi-
nated.3 A suspect is not expected to open the door until he is given a
reason to do so.
B. Exceptions to Announcement
In their separate opinions in Ker, Justices Clark and Brennan articu-
lated different definitions of those situations which constitute excep-
tions to the announcement rule. Justice Clark first declared that exi-
gent circumstances would justify an officer's failure to give notice.
Rather than detail just what these circumstances would be, he merely
pointed out that the officers believed Ker to be "in possession of nar-
cotics, which could be quickly and easily destroyed. '"3 8 Further, Ker's
"furtive conduct" in eluding the officer shortly before the arrest was
ground for the supposition that Ker "might well have been expecting
the police."39 In these circumstances, the constitutional requirements
of announcement could legitimately be abrogated, in Justice Clark's
v. United States, 391 U.S. 585 (1969), the Court required announcement before police
could enter through an unlocked door.
35. 391 U.S. 585 (1968).
36. 347 U.S. 301 (1958); See also People v. Boone, 2 Cal. App. 3d 503, 82 Cal. Rptr.
56 (1970) (police self-identification is not useless by plainclothes policemen in unmarked
car). Cf. Waterhouse v. Saltmarsh, Hob. 264, 80 Eng. Rep. 409 (1724).
37. In Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), a narcotics agent investigating
a heroin sale went to Wong Sun's laundry. The agent first identified himself as a customer,
then announced himself as a narcotics agent, at which point Wong Sun slammed the
door in his face and fled down a hall. In declaring that the homeowner must grant
admission only when the purpose and identity of the officer are clear the Court said:
"When an officer insufficiently or unclearly identifies his office or his mission, the
occupant's flight from the door must be regarded as ambiguous conduct." Id. at 482.
38. 374 U.S. at 40.
89. Id. Ker's "furtive conduct" consisted of the U-turn he made while being followed
by the police. There was no showing that he did this to throw the police off the trail.
Justice Brennan's dissent disputes the notion that Ker's conduct indicated he knew police
were following him. Ird. at 60-61.
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view. Justice Clark seems to imply, then, that in cases involving easily
disposable contraband or where the suspect can be expected to be
aware of an impending police entrance, notice is not necessary.40 This
test would include, in theory, whole classes of crimes where the evi-
dence to be seized was easily disposable.
Justice Brennan gave a much more precise definition of those situa-
tions which constitute exceptions to the announcement rule:
(1) where the persons within already know of the officers' authority
and purpose, or (2) where the officers are justified in the belief that
persons within are in imminent peril of bodily harm, or (3) where
those within, made aware of the presence of someone outside (be-
cause, for example, there has been a knock at the door), are then
engaged in activity which justifies the officers in the belief that an
escape or the destruction of evidence is being attempted.
41
Justice Clark hinted at Justice Brennan's first exception when he noted
that the Kers might have been expecting the police. Further, his opin-
ion is consistent with the second exception regarding violence to inhab-
itants, because invocation of that exception is rare and because he seems,
in general, more amenable to exceptions to announcement than Jus-
tice Brennan.
Moreover, the two Justices agree that certain circumstances demon-
strating destruction of evidence or attempted escape will allow unan-
nounced entry. Justice Brennan explicitly states that his list is exhaus-
tive,42 but it is highly probable that he would include violent resistance
to search or arrest, along with destruction of evidence and escape, in
his third exception. With that modification, Justice Brennan's opinion
correctly expounds all foreseeable exceptions to the announcement
rule.
The main disagreement between the two opinions, then, is over
what evidence will constitute probable cause for the exceptions to an-
nouncement, particularly for the exception when destruction of evi-
dence or resistance is threatened. This disagreement is critical since it
is unclear which opinion, Justice Brennan's or Justice Clark's, provides
guidance for future administration of the exceptions.
43
40. Thus, Justice Clark found it significant that the arresting officer in Ker, on the
basis of "hundreds of arrests involving marijuana," testified that "'on many, many occa-
sions' in his experience with narcotics arrests 'persons have flushed narcotics down toilets,
pushed them down drains and sinks and many other methods of getting rid of them prior
tw my entrance . 8...' 374 U.S. at 28 n.3.
41. Id. at 47. Any one of the three situations would be sufficient to invoke an excep-
tional silent entry.
42. Id.
43. Despite the confusion over which opinion should control, the Supreme Court has
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III. Principles Governing the Nature of Probable Cause Determina-
tions for Exceptions to the Announcement Rule
Three questions of constitutional importance revolve around the
administration of exceptions to the announcement rule: 1) the nature
of the reasonableness standard used to evaluate 2) the type of evidence
that will go to the determination of probable cause and 3) the official
who decides probable cause. Reasonableness is an issue because the
word does not have a fixed meaning throughout Fourth Amendment
cases.4 4 The kind and quantity of evidence that will go to probable
cause is crucial in deciding what factual situations require no-knock,
as the Clark-Brennan disagreement in Ker makes clear. Finally, the
types of evidence properly constituting probable cause have implica-
tions for determining when the judge or policeman should make the
initial decision authorizing unannounced entry and for the type of
review which should be given that initial decision.
In order to decide these difficult questions, it is necessary to develop
principles of interpretation to guide analysis of constitutional issues in
the announcement area. The evolution of these principles will depend
on striking a balance between those values that are enhanced by no-
knock powers and those that are harmed. Broadly speaking, "the re-
quirement of probable cause is a compromise for accommodating the
opposing interests of the public in crime prevention and detection and
of individuals in privacy and security." 45
The tension in the administration of no-knock, as in many stages of
the criminal process, 40 is between efficient processing of the highest
declined to reconsider Ker. In 1966 the Court denied certiorari to People v. De Lago,
16 N.Y.2d 289, 213 N.E.2d 659 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 963 (1966), a New York case
in which judge Van Voorhis upheld no-knock in a gambling case where there was no
showing how the gambling materials would be destroyed. It was enough that "the court
could take judicial notice that contraband of that nature is easily secreted or destroyed"
if persons possessing it are given notice. Id. at 292. In refusing to overturn this "blanket"
rule for entire classes of offenses, it would seem the Supreme Court was following Clark's
opinion. Justice Marshall's opinion in Sabbath v. United States, 891 U.S. 585 (1968),
however, refers, in a cryptic footnote, to the exceptions to an announcement rule
in Justice Brennan's opinion in Ker. Id. at 591 n.8. It is unclear, then, in which
direction the Court will move, if it moves at all.
44. What constitutes a "reasonable" search varies depending on the situation. For
emxample execution of a search warrant at night requires a more stringent showing than
mere probability. See p. 156 infra. On the other hand, a "stop-and-frisk" street search for
dangerous weapons may require a lesser showing of need to be reasonable. Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968). For a discussion of the variable nature of the meaning of reasonableness
and the cases that demonstrate it, see LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry Sibron, Peters and Beyond, 67 MxcIH. L. REV. 40, 54 (1968).
45. LaFave, supra note 44, at 54.
46. The dichotomy between efficiency in crime prevention and primacy of the individual
has been characterized by Herbert L. Packer as two models of criminal procedure: the
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number of guilty and protection of individuals by limiting official
power and eliminating all possible mistake.47 No matter how certain
the probable cause showing is, there will always be individuals who are
not, in fact, engaged in the suspected behavior. In the case of no-knock
powers, there will thus be a certain percentage of persons who have not
committed or who are not committing a crime but who are nonetheless
subject to no-knock entries by the police. There will also be a second
group, who, though they will in fact be guilty of the basic offense (e.g.,
drug possession), will not be engaged in behavior which justifies an
exception to the announcement rule. The fundamental issue resolved
by probable cause requirements in the use of no-knock powers is thus
how much we care to protect people who are not engaging in the kind
of behavior calling for elimination of announcement. If our concern
with these individuals is great, if the values served by the announce-
ment rules are important, and if the values served by no-knock powers
are relatively unimportant, then we want strict probable cause require-
ments for the administration of the exceptions, in order to reduce the
percentage of persons unnecessarily subjected to unannounced entries. 48
A. Values Served by No-Knock
Advocates of no-knock claim these powers aid crime control by
increasing speed and surprise and augmenting safety in execution of
searches and arrests. In some instances, it is argued, the police will,
through no-knock entries, seize evidence that would otherwise be de-
Crime Control model and Due Process model. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal
Process, 113 U. PA. L. Ra,. 1 (1964).
47. Id. at 9-23.
48. An analogous approach to probable cause is taken by LaFave in his analysis of
street encounter arrests and searches. LaFave, supra, note 44 at 55. LaFave finds support
for this test in the cases of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Court,
887 U.S. 523 (1967); and See v. City of Seattle, 887 U.S. 541 (1967). In Camara and See,
"the Court called for a 'balance [of] the need to search against the invasion which the
search entails.' The Court then adopted a lower standard of probable cause for inspection
warrants, in part because these inspections 'involve a relatively limited version of the
urban citizen's privacy.' Thus a new fourth amendment calculus was brought into
being. .." Id. at 55-56. His concept of "variable probable cause" attempts to weigh,
for constitutional purposes, the additional crime control capability given by an enforce-
ment technique against the degree of imposition on the individual. He postulates that
"less evidence is needed to meet the probable cause test when the consequences for the
individual are less serious," and it follows that more evidence is needed when the results
for the individual are more serious, or when the advantages to crime control are less
sure. Id. at 54. The aim of his analysis is to establish guidelines for distinct kinds of
official action so as to avoid leaving the policy choice to ad hoc decision making. The
balancing test is not a matter of case-by-case application, "but rather a technique for
establishing the quantum of evidence needed for certain distinct kinds of official action."
rd. at 57.
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stroyed, thus greatly increasing chances of obtaining a conviction.49
The absence of notice may also increase police safety, since a crucial
edge of speed or surprise may foil a violent assault on the invading
officers. 0 Elimination of announcement may, it is also said, prevent an
escape from arrest.5 '
In assessing the significance of the policies served by no-knock, it is
important to realize, however, that the time saved by the absence of
announcement is on the order of thirty seconds or a minute. Without
no-knock authority the officers may still break into a dwelling. The
difference is that their forcible entry must be preceded by a verbal
statement of who they are and why they are there, giving inhabitants a
reasonable opportunity to open the door and admit them. 2 There will
surely be many instances where the additional speed engendered by a
silent entrance will make no difference whatsoever to the results of the
search or arrest.
53
Furthermore, the factor of surprise which no-knock adds to execu-
tion of searches and arrests, and which supporters claim is important
in preventing destruction of evidence, resistance or escape, may not al-
49. See, e.g., Blakey, supra note 2, at 557; HOUSE CoMM. ON THE DIST. OF CoLUM., DIST.
OF COLUM. COURT REFORM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACT OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 108-09 (1970); 116 CONC. REc. S587 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1970) (remarks of
Senator Dodd).
50. See, e.g., HOUSE Comm. ON THE DIST. OF COLUM., supra note 49, at 107; 116 CONG.
REc. S587 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1970) (remarks of Senator Dodd).
51. See, eg., HOUSE COMM. ON DIST. OF COLUM., supra note 49, at 107.
52. The first step on arriving at the suspect's dwelling is to knock on the door or
ring the bell. If someone comes to the door, the officer identifies himself and his purpose.
He may then use force to enter the dwelling if the person who answers the door runs
away, yells a warning or otherwise prevents the officers from entering. In cases where no
one answers the door in response to their knock, the police nonetheless announce their
identity and purpose. If they are not let in they then may use force to break into the
premises. For a law enforcement officer's manual detailing these procedures, see U.S. DEPT.
OF JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 7 (1968).
53. In the Senate debate on the no-knock bills their sponsors argued that the amount
of time taken by announcement was crucial in permitting suspects to destroy evidence
and/or prepare violently to repel the police. Nowhere in the Senate debates or hearings
on the drug bill, though, did the author find mention of specific instances of announce-
ments delaying police for crucial moments. Many law enforcement officers testified in the
hearings who supported the no-knock provision, but none described past problems they
had with announcement in their searches or what cases would have developed differently
under the proposed no-knock legislation. But see HOUSE COMM. ON THE DIsTcr OF COLUM.,
REPORT ON H.R. 16196, DISTRICT or COLUM. COURT REFORM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
ACr OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 108-09 (1970): "In 1962 . . . it was
reported that less than 30 seconds were necessary to destroy all the evidence of a wire
service headquarters. McClellan, Gambling and Organized Crime, S. Rep. No. 1310, 87th
Cong., 2d Sess. Experience has shown that numbers bets are recorded on either 'flash'
paper which ignites on contact with fire or 'water soluble' paper which dissolves on
contact with water, and that the time spent by the executing officer in giving notice
and waiting to be refused admittance is used by the gambler to destroy his work
product . ... Experience has shown that the time consumed by the executing officers
in announcing their authority and purpose and waiting to be refused admittance is used
by the drug trafficker in disposing of his narcotics down the toilet."
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ways be present in unannounced entries. The police will surprise the
suspects only if they can arrive on the scene in a stealthy manner. Obvi-
ously, if police must spend two minutes hammering the door down, the
inhabitants should be fairly certain that someone is trying to get in.
Safety to the executing officers is a function of no-knock's speed and
surprise. Though personal safety is obviously very important, it is ques-
tionable whether no-knock really makes entry safer for the officers.
Gains to safety must be measured in the light of the knowledge that
entries without announcement may meet legally justified violent re-
sponses from homeowners.5
Even when no-knock is not authorized, there are other, though less
effective, remedies to deal with the evils of destruction of evidence and
resistance to law officers. These acts can be punished as contempt of
court for obstructing the service of legal process, 5  as criminal assaults
on an officer, or as a criminal offense for preventing the seizure of evi-
dence.5
B. Values Served by Announcement
The reasons for the birth and development of the announcement
rule at common law-protection of privacy, mitigation of violence,
and preservation of property-remain of great importance to our
present society. The sanctity of the home has been given constitutional
dimensions in a number of Supreme Court decisions.57 As the tech-
54. For further discussion of the safety issue see pp. 153-54 infra. It can be argued that
the tactical advantages of no-knock are of greater importance in fighting the specially
serious crimes like narcotics use and gambling. It has also been contended that since
narcotics and gambling are "but aspects of the larger problem of organized crime" the
threat posed by such crime must be considered as well. Blakey, supra note 2, at 556:
"The danger to our freedom presented by organized crime differs appreciably from the
traditional danger that all crime poses." One problem with this argument is that "organized
crime" cannot be defined. Even if it could be defined it would also be impossible to
ascertain that a particular criminal transaction or suspect is connected with organized
crime until after arrest or trial. Futhermore, neither the 1970 Drug Act or the D.C. Criminal
Procedure Act limit the use of no-knock to investigations of organized crime. Once
no-knock powers exist they may be applied far beyond any conceivable definition of
organized crime. Even if we posit that selling drugs is a part of organized crime while
possession is not, as discussed below at note 117, the 1970 Drug Act will not, in practice,
distinguish between the two in the use of no-knock.
55. Annot. 39 A.L.R. 1354 (1925).
56. The D.C. Criminal Procedure Act creates an offense carrying a fine of $5,000 or
sentence of up to five years for "[w]hoever, after notice is given - . . or after entry where
such notice is unnecessary . . . destroys, conceals, disposes of, attempts to destroy, conceal
or dispose of, or otherwise prevents the seizure of evidence .... D.C. Code Ann. § 23-
591(d). It is, of course, a criminal offense in all jurisdictions to use force against a police
officer exercising his duties, and where notice was given any violent resistance of an entry
to make a search would clearly be a violation. Where notice is not given, it is highly
uncertain that a violent response by the homeowner would be illegal. See pp. 153-54
infra.
57. Camara v. Muncipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967): "The basic purpose of [the
Fourth Amendment] as recognized by countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard
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nological capability of public and private agencies to pierce the walls
of a dwelling grows, the need for staunch maintenance of legal barriers
to entry increases accordingly. The areas in which a person can feel
free from unexpected intrusion are few indeed. Thus, police announce-
ment of their presence, identity and purpose in execution of a search
or arrest provides a basis for a belief that one need not fear an unex-
pected incursion; this psychological security is arguably as important
as a few minutes notice to an inhabitant during which he can dress or
unlock the door.58 The requirement of announcement secures to an
individual the feeling of control over his own dwelling, upholding
the dignity of the citizen against the state. No one can enjoy privacy
who is not master of the grant or denial of access to others.59 In both
the figurative and literal senses, privacy is impossible unless a person
can maintain the boundaries he desires between himself and the rest
of his environment.60 Broadly interpreted exceptions to the announce-
ment rule palpably weaken private control of those boundaries.
Moreover today, as in the past, the homeowner is entitled under
common law to repulse an unannounced invader by force.61 As both
police and public continue to arm themselves to the teeth, 62 police en-
trances under no-knock cannot but lead to many violent incidents. The
consequences of large numbers of unannounced entries are truly fright-
ening. Many homeowners in a high crime area may well open fire on
any unannounced entrant, thus endangering police. Equally important,
in such a situation police may well counterattack with all available fire-
power. It is conceivable that police might make an unannounced en-
trance to draw fire, thus providing the justification for an official fusil-
lade.63 Further, unannounced entries can provoke outbursts of public
the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by governmental
officials. The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people
which is 'basic to a free society.'" See also Mapp v. Ohio, 867 U.S. 648, 656 (1961); Poe v.
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-52 (1961) (dissent of Harlan, J.); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
58. Two commentators describe the avoidance of a broken door or embarrassment to
persons engaged in sexual acts as the only possible, and "somewhat tenuous," protections
to privacy. Sonnenreich and Ebner, supra note 2, at 647.
59. Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968).
60. See id. at 475-86.
61. See Annot. 25 A.L.R. 508, Annot. 32 A.L.R. 1541, Annot. 34 A.L.R. 488. See also
Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 620-21 (1894); State v. Cessna, 170 Iowa 726, 153 N.W.
194 (1915). If notice is given, force may not be used. Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120
Mass. 190 (1876).
62. See, e.g., US. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENcE, REPORT
(1969); New York Times, July 29, 1969, at 1, col. 1.
63. This may have happened in the raid on the Chicago Black Panther headquarters
that resulted in the deaths of Fred Hampton and Mark Clark. The special federal grand
jury in Chicago found that only one shot had been fired from inside the apartment, while
at least 82 shots were fired by entering police. The grand jury report found that the
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violence expressing outrage at such incursions.0
The danger of violent response and counter-response obviously
should be minimized when the suspect is innocent of any criminal be-
havior or when the suspect has actually committed the suspected crime
but is not acting in a manner which justifies abrogation of the an-
nouncement rule. In both cases, the suspect may well be heavily armed.
Not only will the suspect think he has the right to use force, but police,
once fired upon or attacked, will feel compelled to retaliate. A court
will have an extraordinarily difficult time assessing who is legally re-
sponsible for the subsequent injuries in so delicate a situation. Thus, a
sphere of "no-law" is created by no-knock powers, where both police
and the suspect may employ force-force which, on both parts, cannot
clearly be called legitimate or illegitimate. The probability of this am-
biguous-and therefore highly undesirable-use of force by either pri-
vate parties or public officials will be increased by the absence of an-
nouncement. It follows therefore that announcement should be max-
imized in order to reduce that "no-law" sphere.6 5
The function of preserving doors and windows from destruction,
while arguably less important today than in the past, retains some va-
lidity. In those critical cases in which the suspect is in fact not involved
in behavior justifying an exception to the announcement requirement,
an occurrence that will inevitably result under any probable cause
standard, there is a needless and fairly costly destruction of property. 6
Finally, informing the balance of interests is the intent of the fram-
ers that announcement be required. With announcement, as with all
other areas of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court
should place heavy reliance on the intent of the framers.67
police at best were returning "one another's fire." New York Times, May 16, 1970, at
1, col. 1.
64. Thus there were minor public disturbances in a black neighborhood of Washington,
D.C., following the sledge-hammer opening of a door in a fruitless search for narcotics.
Washington Post, Sept. 26, 1970, at B1-B2, col. 6.
65. Thus, while announcement on occasion may endanger the safety of the executing
officer, see p. 152 supra, the absence of no-knock has equivalent, if not greater, dangers.
After announcement, at least, the legal rights of the parties to use force are clear.
66. In Washington, D.C., police will pay for the broken door only when they have
gone to the wrong address, producing increasing complaints by citizens forced to replace
their doors. Washington Post, Sept. 26, 1970, at Bl-B2, col. 6. The purpose of preserving
property served by announcement thus continues to be important today.
67. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-26 (1886); Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 162 (1947) (dissent of Frankfurter, J.):
"Unreasonable" is not to be determined with reference to a particular search and
seizure considered in isolation. The "reason" by which search and seizure is to be
tested is the "reason" that was written out of historic experience into the Fourth
Amendment. Historically we are dealing with a provision of the Constitution which
sought to guard against an abuse that more than any one single factor gave rise to
American independence. Id. at 159.
See also I. BaRAT, THE BILL OF RIGHrs 79 (1965):
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C. Principles Governing the Probable Cause Determination
In resolving the conflict between the announcement rule and the
no-knock procedures, the constitutional status of the announcement
requirement and the serious harms to innocent parties attendant on
no-knock's use argue for strict probable cause requirements, if elim-
ination of announcement is to be justifiable. As noted above, loose
probable cause requirements will increase the number of individuals
who are not engaged in activity bringing them within the terms of
announcement's exceptions but who will be subjected, nonetheless, to
unannounced police entries. Tighter requirements will, in contrast,
minimize that number. The small gains in speed and surprise from
no-knock procedures, compared with both the threats to privacy and
property and the significant danger of violent harm to occupants and
police resulting from lack of announcement, make it imperative that
the number of people who are not engaged in behavior that would
constitute an exception to the announcement rule and yet whose homes
are violated by unannounced entries be minimized. Therefore, the
general principle of interpretation in the administration of no-knock
powers should be maximization of announcement through stringent
probable cause requirements. This principle has three corollaries:
Specificity. As the Court made explicit in Terry v. Ohio68 the "cen-
tral teaching" of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is the need for
specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated:
"[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able
to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intru-
sion."0 Specificity contributes to minimizing the instances where no-
knock is used unnecessarily. It does this by demanding that the evi-
dence used to establish probable cause relates to information about the
particular time, place and individual upon which the search or arrest
is based.
High probability. To maximize the instances where announcement
is used, the only no-knock entrances that should be "reasonable" under
If it is true that freedom is a growing thing, it cannot have a lesser meaning today
or tomorrow than it had at the birth of our nation. . . . [What the framers of the
Bill of Rights thought they were doing .. .will form a barricade against retreat.
68. 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968). The Court derived this statement from the following
cases: Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34-37 (1963);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-84 (1963); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S.
253, 261-62 (1960); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 100-02 (1959); Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307, 312-14 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-78 (1949).
69. 392 U.S. at 21.
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the Fourth Amendment are situations where there is a high probability
no-knock is necessary; i.e., that the "exceptional situation" is, in fact,
occurring.70 The more rigorous probable cause test which is invoked
when searches are to be executed at night provides a useful analogy;
daytime search is favored to better protect privacy and avoid violence
-precisely the same policies which urge the maximization of an-
nouncement prior to entry. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
demand a higher degree of probable cause for these nighttime search
warrants than for warrants in general: nighttime execution is permissi-
ble only "if the affidavits are positive that the property is on the person
or in the place to be searched .... ,,71 If the standard for exceptions to
announcement requires high probability, a showing of mere likeli-
hood, a fortiori, is not adequate to support a probable cause finding.
Given the great importance of announcement values, the specific facts
should almost certainly constitute an exceptional situation before an-
nouncement is waived.72 This higher level of probability for probable
cause to use no-knock would not affect the lower level of probable
cause necessary for the underlying search or arrest in any way.73 The
higher probability for an authorization for silent entry thus would not
influence the number of searches or arrests made.
Careful review. The need for high probability and specificity dictate
that the initial probable cause decision be made after careful consider-
ation of the evidence presented. 74 Also, in light of the constitutional
issues involved, there should be careful scrutiny of the initial decision
by officer or magistrate.7 5 When the facts justifying an unannounced
search or arrest do not meet constitutional requirements, the exclu-
sionary rule applies, it was held in Ker, barring any evidence which is
the product of the entry from use at trial.
7 6
70. In its first announcement case, Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 801, the Court
hinted strongly that officers could dispense with announcement if "the facts known to
officers would justify them in being virtually certain that the [suspect] already knows
their purpose .... " Id. at 310. Thus there is precedent for the high probability of what
constitutes probable cause.
71. Fed. R. Grim. P. 41(c). See also Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958),
where the Court emphasizes that the officers must be positive.
72. For a strikingly different result to the probable cause balancing test see Blakey,
supra note 2, at 555-59.
73. Cf. United States v. Arms, 392 F.2d 300, 301 (1968), a case concerning nighttime
execution of a search warrant. The court contrasted the facts to justify an affiant in being
"positive" "with the lesser quantum sufficient only to support a belief that the property is
to be found in the premises for which a search warrant is sought."
74. See p. 170 infra.
75. Cf. Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827, 828 (1965): "[Ojlose scrutiny of such a deter-
minative issue is required to assure protection of constitutional rights and to aid in the
promulgation of uniform constitutional privileges."
76. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 46-47 (opinion of Justice Brennan). This holding is
derived from Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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IV. Administration of the Exceptions
The maximization of announcement principle and its corollaries
shape answers to the questions raised above about what kinds of evi-
dence establish probable cause and who determines whether sufficient
probable cause exists to warrant no-knock. Even though cases have not
yet arisen under the federal no-knock statutes, the relative value of
different kinds of evidence can be assessed in the light of the suggested
framework of analysis. The following discussion will apply that frame-
work to each of Justice Brennan's exceptions to announcement.
A. Evidentiary Sources of Probable Cause Determination
1) Officers presence and purpose are known. There clearly ought to
be a high probability that the suspect actually knows the police are at
his door desiring admittance before this exception can apply. Imputed
knowledge or a belief by police officers that the reasonable suspect
would always assume an unannounced entrant to be the police would
never suffice. One case meeting the criteria of specificity and high prob-
ability would be the hot pursuit of a suspect into his own dwelling.
77
An escape to the dwelling of another is slightly more difficult, since the
arrival of the suspect might not alert the inhabitants of the dwelling
to the impending appearance of the police.
78
Absent hot pursuit, there are few situations that will sufficiently
establish that the officers' presence and purpose are both known.
Frenzied shouts of "it's the police!" accompanied by noise of commotion
within the dwelling is one example.70 Once their presence is known,
the officers may not assume, however, that their obligation to announce
77. It is stated in an annotator's note to Semayne's Case, supra note 12, that "if a man
being legally arrested, escapeth from the officer, the officer may upon fresh suit break open
doors in order to retake him, having first given due notice of his business and demanded
admission, and been refused." 77 Eng. Rep. at 196; 374 U.S. 23, 54 n.8. But see Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
78. Semayne's Case describes such a situation as follows: "J beats R so he is in
danger of death .... J retreats into the house of T. They who pursue him, if the house
be kept and defended with force (which proves that first request ought to be made) may
lawfully break the house of T." 77 Eng. Rep. at 196. The Case of Richard Curtis, Fost.
35, 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (1757), involved officers executing an escape warrant who shouted their
authority and purpose through the locked door. Chitty states that the house of a third
party harboring an offender may be broken open only after the usual demand. Cnrrrv,
supra note 15, at 57. See also Ratcliffe v. Burton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 223, 127 Eng. Rep. 123
(1802) (Judge Heath).
Early English law was probably reluctant to permit the breaking of the doors of a
third person housing a fugitive, even where it was likely that notice would be superfluous,
because of the concern that was placed on preserving the doors intact. Annihilation of
this barrier against the dangers of the locale was disfavored. See 142 supra.
79. People v. Clay, 273 Cal. App. 2d 279, 78 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1969).
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their purpose is eliminated.80 They must be "virtually certain"8' that
all three elements of a lawful announcement-presence, identity and
purpose-are known to the suspect before announcement is a "super-
fluous act the law does not require.
82
When this level of certainty is present, this exception does not conflict
with the aims of the announcement rule. Where the identity and pur-
pose of the officer are known his entrance can be fairly anticipated,
lessening, if not eliminating, the imposition on the inhabitant's pri-
vacy. Similarly, the kind of violent response a homeowner is entitled to
wreak on an unknown trespasser would not lawfully be permitted to
one who is aware that an officer is about to enter. Violent attack in such
a situation would not be defense of the home, but a premeditated as-
sault on the officer.
8 3
2) Person in imminent danger. This exception should generally be
based on police observance of attack on a party in a dwelling or on
the publicly announced intention of the suspects to harm the person
they are detaining if police enter (as in the holding of hostages). It
should be remembered that this exception applies only where the im-
minent danger is to the person already inside the place to be searched.
Ambiguous noise or activity in a building is never enough by itself to
justify the exception.8 4 Although this exception has a relatively ancient
history,8 5 there are few recorded cases of its use.88 Thus this exception
80. See p. 147 supra.
81. The "virtually certain" test comes from Miller v. United States. See note 70 supra.
82. 374 U.S. at 55. Professor Wilgus has written: "Before doors are broken, there must
be a necessity for so doing and notice of the authority and purpose to make the arrest
must be given and a demand and refusal of admission must be made, unless this is already
understood, or the peril would be increased." Wilgus, Arrest Without Warrant, 22 MicH.
L. REv. 798, 802 (1924).
83. This should be contrasted to the situation where announcement is absent and
attack may be legally permissible. See pp. 153-54 supra.
84. But see People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 303 P.2d 721 (1956). The police investigat-
ing a robbery went to a suspect's apartment and knocked. No one answered but they
heard several moans and groans that sounded as if a person was in distress, so they had
the apartment manager let them in. Though a search of the apartment revealed that no
one was there, the police scanned the room for stolen goods, finding one. On cross-
examination one of the officers said that in his present opinion the moaning could have
been pigeons. Nevertheless, the court held that the entire testimony of the officers was
not so incredulous as to be rejected as unworthy of belief.
85. Chitty states that "in case of an actual affray made in a house, within the view
and hearing of a constable . . . he may break open the doors to arrest the affrayers, or
suppress the tumult. And it has been decided that upon a violent cry of murder in a
house, any person may break open the door to prevent the commission of a felony."
But Chitty goes on to state that "in all cases whatever . . . it is absolutely necessary that
a demand for admittance should be made, and be refused, before outer doors can be
broken." CHrrry, supra note 15, at 56.
86. Even advocates of no-knock can present few instances of this exception. See Blakey,
supra note 2, at 542-43.
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to announcement will probably be invoked quite rarely; abuse will be
difficult, in the absence of outright fabrication of evidence by police.s7
3) Destruction of evidence, resistance or escape. Since no-knock leg-
islation is designed to operate almost exclusively within the exception
for destruction of evidence, resistance or escape, the situations which
will establish this exception in essence determine the scope of no-knock
authority.88 The following kinds of evidence are most likely to be in-
troduced to justify an unannounced entry under this exception:
(1) police experience with a certain class of crime; (2) past behavior
of the suspect; and information, most often gained through informers,
as to (3) the intended reaction of the suspect to a police raid or (4)
the type, quantity and (5) location of evidence; and (6) on-the-scene
observation by the executing officers.8 9
Blanket Rule: Any finding of probable cause for no-knock solely on
the basis of police experience with a particular kind of offense should
be unconstitutional; it eliminates announcement in entire classes of
crimes, is not specific to either the individual suspect or the time of
entrance, and is not subject to review or control.90 Justice Clark's opin-
87. See note 138 infra.
88. Read v. Case, an 1822 Connecticut case, is usually cited as the origin of American
"destruction of evidence" exceptions to the common law rule of announcement. 4 Conn.
166. The case arose out of the attempt by defendant Case to arrest Read, for whom he
had posted bail. The local sheriff had earlier proposed to Read that he surrender himself,
to which Read had replied that he would defend himself with a gun. With this com-
ment in mind the sheriff knocked on the door while Case, who was in Read's home,
opened the door and seized Read's gun. The court created a narrow exception to the
requirement of announcement where the inhabitant had resolved "with full knowledge of
the purpose for which he was sought after, to resist even to the shedding of blood."
The judge stated: "Imminent danger to human life, resulting from the threats and
intended violence of the principal towards his bail, constitutes a case of high necessity ... :
Demand for entrance would have resulted in the most "brutal and unhallowed vengeance."
Id. at 170. Cf. The Case of Richard Curtis, Fost. 135, 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (1757).
The outcome in this case can probably as easily be explained by the fact that Read
knew that he was being sought and by whom, which would put him within Justice
Brennan's first exception-where purpose and identity are known. He had told the very
person making the entry that he would respond violently; it took little speculation by the
sheriff to believe an announcement would increase both his peril and the likelihood of
violence.
89. Neither Justice in Ker detailed the kind of information police should have before
a no-knock entry would be permitted.
90. Two common law cases refused to find that the mere possibility of escape was
enough to warrant a belief that the suspect would escape, for then there would never be
announcement. In Ratcliffe v. Barton, S Bos. & Pul. 223, 127 Eng. Rep. 123 (1802), an
officer broke an inner door without demand for admittance after entering peacefully
through the outer doors. The majority rejected the contention of Chief Justice Alvanley
that "If the officer have certain knowledge that the party is within the house, it might
be absurd for him to demand any admittance; since if he were to do so, the party might
possibly escape by the window while the officer was demanding admittance at the door."
Id. at 229, 127 Eng. Rep. at 126. The majority, recognizing this possibility, felt it was
outweighed by the dangers such power would produce in the hands of the sheriff. Sim-
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ion in Ker appears to countenance such a "blanket" exception to the
announcement requirement for certain offense categories, but close
analysis of the reasoning which would approve the use of such evidence
reveals grave flaws. Since there was no indication that the Kers had
made any plans or attempts to destroy the evidence (the marijuana),
Justice Clark supported the lack of announcement by stating that the
officers believed that the Kers possessed narcotics, "which could be
quickly and easily destroyed;" 91 that is, in other narcotics cases police
announcement had resulted in attempts to destroy evidence, so the
police in Ker were warranted in foregoing announcement in this case.
Justice Clark's opinion, then, would allow evidence of police experi-
ence with a particular type of offender to fulfill, without more, the
constitutional probable cause requirement. Justice Brennan explicated
the injuries this test would inflict on Fourth Amendment values:
[I]f police experience in pursuing other narcotics suspects justi-
fied an unannounced police intrusion into a home the Fourth
Amendment would afford no protection at all .... If mere police ex-
perience that some offenders have attempted to destroy contraband
justifies unannounced entry in any case, and cures the total ab-
sence of evidence not only of awareness of the officers' presence but
even of such an attempt in the particular case, I perceive no logical
basis for distinguishing unannounced police entries into homes to
make arrests for any crime involving evidence of a kind which
public experience indicates might be destroyed or jettisoned.
2
California's experience in administering the "blanket rule" of police
experience to justify unannounced entries, and its subsequent rejection
of that rule, are instructive in illustrating the dangers this test poses for
announcement values. Justice Clark quoted extensively, and with ap-
proval from People v. Maddox,93 the leading California case on excep-
tions to the requirement of announcement at the time. In that case the
California Supreme Court moved sharply away from the requirement
of announcement by permitting a no-knock entry where the officer
believed in good faith evidence would be destroyed or the arrest or
search resisted.94 Since the police had probable cause to search in the
ilarly the court in Launock v. Brown, 2 B. & Ald. 592, 106 Eng. Rep. 482 (1819) rejected
the defendant's argument that if a previous request be necessary it would give the party
accused notice that he may make his escape.
91. 374 U.S. at 40.
92. Id. at 61-62 (emphasis in original). See also The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77
HARv. L. R-xv. 62, 115 (1963).
93. 46 Cal. 2d 301, 294 P.2d 6 (1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858 (1956).
94. The standard set forth for future searches was that evidence would not be excluded
when the facts known to the officer before his entry were "not inconsistent with a good
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first place, no further showing was deemed necessary for them to enter
unannounced. 95 Basing the decision to enter silently on the officer's
"reasonable belief" that evidence would be destroyed soon led to the
abandonment of announcement in whole varieties of offenses; the of-
ficer's belief about the behavior of a whole class of suspects was inter-
preted as sufficient for any specific instance within the class.96 In
reaction to these interpretations of the Maddox rule, in People v. Gas-
tello the California Supreme Court cut back on the exception, requiring
"a specific showing ... to justify any kind of police action tending to
disturb the security of the people in their homes."9 7 The court in
Gastello did not elaborate the elements of the "specific showing" that
would excuse a silent entry, since there was not even a hint that the
defendant, who was sleeping when the police arrived, was attempting
to destroy evidence.98
In 1969 the California Supreme Court, in People v. De Santiago,99
stated in more detail the factors which would constitute a reasonably
specific showing of planned destruction of evidence or imminent escape
to merit abandonment of the usual police statement of identity and
purpose. The police must have particular reason, different from that
providing the basic probable cause for entry, to enter without an-
nouncement. The court then gave two situations when officers could
enter without announcement to preserve evidence intact: first, when
officers have obtained particular information which leads them reason-
ably to conclude that the occupants of an apartment or residence have
specifically resolved to effect disposal in the event of police intrusion, or
have made specific preparations in that regard; and second, when officers
faith belief on the part of the officer that compliance with [the rule of announcement as
required by] section 844 is excused." Id. at 306-07, 294 P.2d at 9.
95. "[Slince the officer's right to invade defendant's privacy clearly appears, there is
no compelling need for strict compliance with the requirements of section 844 to protect
basic constitutional guarantees." Id. at 306, 294 P.2d at 9.
96. California Courts of Appeals quickly travelled down precisely the slippery slope
described by Justice Brennan, to the point where the California Attorney General con-
tended that silent entries are always reasonable in narcotics cases, since the suspects are
always alert to destroy evidence. See Blakey, supra note 2, at 515-16. See also People v.
Ramsey, 157 Cal. App. 2d 178, 320 P.2d 592 (1958) and People v. Potter, 144 Cal. App. 2d
350, 300 P.2d 889 (1956), where a prior criminal record was used to establish the pos-
sibility of peril which would justify entry without notice. For a summary of the problems
in administering the Maddox exceptions and their tendency to slip into blanket avoid-
ance of announcement in narcotics and bookmaking cases, see People v. De Santiago, 71
Cal. 2d 18, 22-23, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 813-14, 453 P.2d 353, 357-58 (1969); People v.
Gastello, 67 Cal. 2d 586, 432 P.2d 706 (1967).
97. Id. at 588, 432 P.2d at 708.
98. A year later the court found a prior criminal record and escape from parole
inadequate to create a reasonable police belief that a suspect would resist arrest. People
v. Rosales, 66 Cal. Rptr. 1, 437 P.2d 489 (1968).
99. 71 Cal. 2d 18, 76 Cal. Rptr. 809, 453 P.2d 353 (1969).
161
The Yale Law Journal
prior to entry are able to detect activity from within which leads them
reasonably to conclude that the occupants are then engaged in the
destruction or concealment of evidence.100 In De Santiago, the California
Supreme Court thus abandoned the rule that police experience with a
type of offender was sufficient to involve no-knock, and demanded a
specific showing, either to the magistrate or by the officer on the scene,
of some circumstances peculiar to that search. The dangers to citizens of
relying on the "blanket rule" for certain types of crimes by failing to
require specificity were thus found by California to be so serious that
sole reliance on this type of evidence was unequivocally prohibited.
Justice Clark's approach in Ker, then, has grave flaws in view of
California's experience and Justice Brennan's analysis. De Santiago and
Justice Brennan are dearly correct in holding that a specific showing of
facts peculiar to the given search must be present if the constitutional
rule of announcement is to be maintained. 1' 1 This lack of specificity in
the "blanket rule" puts no limits on police discretion and makes judi-
cial review impossible.10 2 For these reasons, Justice Clark's opinion
should not be followed. De Santiago and Justice Brennan, on the other
hand, while meeting the demand for specificity, do not speak to the
issue of the degree of probability in the probable cause showing. Their
standards, if coupled with the high degree of probability necessary to
maximize announcement values, would fulfill the needs of a constitu-
tional definition of probable cause.
Past behavior of the individual suspect: Past behavior of the suspect
will be probative of the need for silent entry only where it is directly
related to the issues of destruction of evidence or resistance to arrest. A
mere showing that the suspect has a criminal record reveals nothing
100. Id. at 816, 458 P.2d at 860.
101. See p. 160 supra and Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
102. Basing probable cause in the case of one narcotics suspect on the fact that many
narcotics suspects attempt to destroy evidence reduces the probable cause showing to demon-
strating that the suspect is involved with narcotics. Thus, no more need be shown than what
constitutes probable cause for the search warrant itself. The probable cause requirement
written in the no-knock provision therefore becomes a nullity. Furthermore, by basing
probable cause on grounds related only to police experience, there is no semblance of
tailoring the warrant to the needs of the particular situation. See p. 155 supra. If the
judge is satisfied with the evidence that as a narcotics dealer the suspect can reasonably
be expected to attempt to destroy evidence or resist the police, then the judge's role is
correspondingly circumscribed. A major thrust of the effort to write no-knock provisions
into search warrants is to establish judicial overview of these potentially explosive entries.
See SENATE COMMa. ON THE DisTRICr OF COLUM., REvISING THE CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE OF THE DISTRICr OF COLUM., AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, S. REP. No. 538, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 13, 14 (1969). Cf. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948).
An interpretation of the no-knock legislation that did not take advantage of this oppor-
tunity for judicial control would thus disregard the intent of Congress. Where informa-
tion fulfilling the need for probable cause relates to neither the particular suspect nor
locale to be searched only the most rudimentary judicial scrutiny is possible.
162
Vol. 80: 139, 1970
Announcement in Police Entries
about his behavior in police searches. A prior record of resisting arrest
is probative to some extent, depending upon the seriousness of the
resistance and the number of times it has occurred. In the extreme case
of numerous violent responses to police entrance, no-knock would be
justified, but otherwise prior convictions, even for resisting arrest,
should not, standing alone, justify no-knock. All prior behavior of this
kind provides only a tenuous prediction of what a suspect may do in
the future. 10 3 In short, predictions based on past behavior cannot be
"specific" to time, nor probable enough to justify abrogation of an-
nouncement, unless the past behavior is so consistent as to warrant the
virtually certain inference it will be repeated.
The next four categories of evidence-intent of suspect, and type,
quantity and location of contraband-will almost invariably be based
on informers' testimony.104 The extent to which informer's testimony
is specific and reliable is thus important in determining whether such
evidence may go to the issue of probable cause. The Supreme Court
recently held in Spinelli v. United States05 that for a magistrate to make
an independent judgment about probable cause the circumstances
underlying the informer's conclusions must be given and the in-
formant's reliability must be shown. If the circumstances underlying
the informer's conclusions and his reliability are not demonstrated,
the police may independently corroborate the details of the informant's
tip. 0
0
The first element of Spinelli's requirements, reliability of the in-
former, seems difficult to establish in drug and gambling cases. Since
his livelihood, and possibly freedom from prosecution, depends heavily
on police satisfaction with his work, the informer is often motivated
103. It may be argued that a suspect with a criminal record would be more anxious
to avoid another conviction, carrying a longer sentence, and therefore more likely to
attempt to frustrate a search, but there is no evidence that the motivations to impede
a search are any greater for a person with a previous record than for one who has never
been convicted. Cf. discussion of predictions of parole violation based on past behavior
in R. DONNELLY, J. GOLDSTEIN AND R. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 238-41 (1962).
104. Informers are very heavily used in gambling and narcotics investigations. "Without
a network of informers-usually civilians, sometimes police--narcotics police cannot
operate." J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE wrrHoUT TRIAL 120 (1966). "Present enforcement of federal
narcotics laws depends largely upon the use of known drug peddlers to lead the Govern-
ment to others involved in illegal activity. It is safe to say that ninety-five per cent of
all federal narcotics cases are obtained as a result of the work of informers .... " Note,
Informers in Federal Narcotics Prosecutions, 2 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 47 (1966). See
also Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs,
60 YALE L. J. 1091 (1951). For the police view, including a teaching manual and justifica-
tion for the use of informers, written by two narcotics control officers, see M. HARNEY and
J. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAw ENFORCEMrNT (2d ed. 1968).
105. 395 U.S. 410 (1969).
106. Id. at 417. The example of corroboration given in Spinelli was independent
police observation of facts given by the informer.
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to create a case by entrapment or framing a suspect..0 7 Usually the
informer is under pressure from the law enforcement agency to make
cases.' 08 The informer knows what the police want and is prepared to
give it to them if he possibly can, with accuracy and honesty often
being of secondary importance. 10 9 Further, falsification of minor facts,
where probable cause for the search or arrest already exists, will clearly
be less disturbing to police and informers than a complete "frame-
up.""i 0 The only difference resulting from fabrication of evidence to
justify no-knock is the manner of entry, which may seem minor indeed
to the informers.
Moreover, law enforcement officers, in their zeal to obtain a no-knock
warrant, may distort and magnify informers' reports that the suspect
plans to destroy evidence or resist arrest, or is armed, or has placed
the evidence in a strategic location for destruction. Thus, informers'
reliability should be further suspect. In other instances, an analogous
pattern of police falsehood to establish probable cause for searching
suspects on the street has developed."' In such a situation even a
requirement of corroboration by the police officers may not cure the
unreliability of the reports.
107. Donnelly, supra note 104, at 1099-1115. "The system rewards only the informer
who successfully makes a 'sufficient' number of cases. Because of this emphasis, the
informer, fighting for years of his life, will often go to any extent to achieve a good
record. As a result, many persons ... are involved in narcotics violations by an informer
who needs to make a case." Note, Informers in Federal Narcotics Prosecutions, supra
note 104, at 48-49. Cf. Trent v. United States, 284 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
865 U.S. 889 (1961).
108. Most informers are rewarded for their cooperation by low bail, lighter sentences
and special treatment. Note, Informers in Federal Narcotics Prosecutions, supra note 104,
at 51, 54. "[Narcotics informers include primarily two types of people: those who are
not addicts themselves, but who work in or around places addicts frequent; and known
addicts. Non-addicts cooperate because they want to avoid difficulties with the police or
more importantly, with 'official' agencies that inspect and license. . . .Addicts typically
cooperate with police because they have been caught doing something illegal and want a
reduction in charges or some sort of 'break' in the criminal process." SKOLNICK, supra
note 104, at 123-24. See also HARNEY AND CRoss, supra note 104, at 33; Donnelly, supra
note 104, at 1092-96.
109. "The police are also accustomed to getting a great deal of information, mostly
false, from persons who have been arrested and who hope, by giving information, to ob-
tain favorable treatment. Paid informants have also proved unreliable, since they some-
times fabricate stories in order to receive compensation." W. LAFAVE, AREST 269 (1965).
110. Cf. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REv. 177, 181 (1969); "In view
of the substantial risk that a paid informant's story is inaccurate, if not false, it is not
too much to expect that he might also falsify a claim to have personally observed the
criminal activity .... "
111. Barlow, Patterns of Arrest for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan
Police Practices 1960-62, 4 CRIm. LAw BULL. 549 (1968). Following the Supreme Court
decision in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the fruits of a search conducted without
probable cause could no longer be used as evidence in state courts, as had been their
previous practice. Probable cause was difficult to find in misdemeanor cases unless the
suspect was seen committing the crime or abandoning something that resembled contra-
band. After the Mapp decision, the number of police affidavits reporting that the suspect
had dropped contraband before being searched ("dropsy" cases) jumped enormously. The
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Because of the high danger of informer unreliability, it is important
that the second element of Spinelli be firmly established-that the
circumstances underlying informers' statements be known and have
a high degree of specificity. But the following discussion of the kinds of
evidence informers are likely to supply will reveal the evidence's lack
of specificity to the suspect, time and place of search. Thus the underly-
ing circumstances of the informers' information will present problems
to an official making a probable cause determination.
Expressed intent to destroy evidence or resist the search: A statement
by the accused, that he intends to destroy evidence or resist arrest in the
event of police search, clearly should carry some evidentiary weight in
determining whether probable cause exists for no-knock. However,
even assuming reliability of informers, there is still a need to question
the circumstances underlying the statements. An informer may be gen-
eralizing from his experience with classes of suspects 12 or projecting his
own attitudes on the suspect, so the basis for his conclusions must be
shown, as Spinelli indicates. Moreover, even when the underlying facts
behind the informer's conclusion are given, further specific evidence
ought to be required to allow silent entry. Expressions of intent,
especially if given in response to hypothetical questions posed by the
informant and interpreted by him,"13 do not relate to the specific search
to be conducted. A vague declaration that one would destroy evidence
in the event of a hypothetical search does not conclusively predict
behavior in particular circumstances. Expressions of intent thus may
not be specific enough as to time to establish, without more, the high
probable cause necessary for exceptions to announcement.
Type and quantity of evidence: In general, the type of evidence
reliably reported to exist at the scene of search is relevant to the no-
knock decision only to the extent that such evidence may be easily
most likely conclusion, advanced by Paul Chevigny in his comments following the article,
was that many policemen swore false affidavits in order to maintain their level of misde-
meanor narcotics arrests. This new and dishonest activity arose in direct reaction to the
Mapp decision. It is not unlikely that a new standard of probable cause in no-knock
searches would call forth a similar response. Such "minor surgery upon the facts is a
not uncommon phenomenon in police efforts to show probable cause for a certain kind
of search." See, e.g., LAFAvE, supra note 44, at 65 n.126; Kuh, In-Field Interrogation: Stop,
Question, Detention and Frisk, 3 Crim. L. BULL. 597, 604 (1967); L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE
ANID D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIMsE 65 (1967).
112. See, e.g., Martinez v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 78 Cal. Rptr.
427 (1969).
113. Leading questions and other "Socratic" devices could cause the suspect to admit
that in some conceivable situations he would attempt to dispose of evidence or resist.
The pressure on the informant to get this type of admission would be great. See pp.
163-64 supra.
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destroyed. But ease of destruction goes only to feasibility; standing
alone, such proof could not justify silent entry: some evidence of intent
to destroy ought always be required. In narcotics cases, it should not be
too difficult for the informer to identify the type or types of drug in the
suspect's possession and give facts justifying his conclusion. Although
some drugs (e.g., heroin) can be destroyed more quickly than others
(e.g., marijuana),114 knowledge of the type of drug alone would not
sufficiently indicate the quantity in the suspect's possession.115
If the quantity is small, it will be possible to destroy; but mere
possibility of disposal is not probative of an intent to destroy, and other
evidence must be shown for silent entry. If the quantity of drugs is
large enough, destruction of evidence in the time taken by announce-
ment would be a physical impossibility, and would actually mitigate
against no-knock. This is ironic because it seems likely that law officers
will be most anxious to use a silent entry if large quantities are present,
since arrests of major suppliers are highly desired.110 Thus, if the
quantity of drugs is above a size reasonable for destruction in the time
taken by announcement no-knock should not be considered further; if
the quantity is below that "crucial level" the high probability of de-
struction has then to be corroborated by other evidence.1
17
114. This results from the fact that, on the average, more marijuana than heroin is
seized per arrest and also from the fact that pure heroin is cut with non-narcotic sub-
stances prior to use. The median quantity of narcotics (heroin) seized per case by the
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs in 1969 was 67.6 grams, compared with 1008.5
grams per case in marijuana cases. Hearings on S.1895, 2590, 2637 before the Subcommittee
to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. at 663 (Sept. 15, 17, 18, 24-26, 29 and Oct. 20, 1969).
115. Also, the type of drug, to a certain extent, determines the seriousness of the
offense. Since the seriousness of the offense in turn often influences the severity of judicial
requirements for a search warrant, it is likely that probable cause for a no-knock entry
will, in practice, be found to exist more easily in a case involving one type of drug than
another. See TIFFANY, MCINTYRE AND ROTENBERG, DarECTION OF CRIME 119-20 (1967). Cf.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (opinion of Justice Jackson) (1949). The
existence of a particular type of drug and the feasibility of its disposal in themselves,
however, are not probative of an intent to destroy evidence or inflict bodily harm on a
police officer.
116. See J. SKOLNICK, supra note 104, at 155-59.
117. It is interesting to note that the quantities seized in narcotics, marijuana and
dangerous drugs cases by the Bureau of Narcotics in 1969 were often quite large; large
enough as to be impossible of quick destruction. The average and median amounts
seized of the three categories of drugs are given below. It is easy to see that under the
no-knock provision of the drug law, probable cause in these cases often could not be
based on the easy destructibility of the evidence. Several pounds of marijuana or heroin
cannot be easily flushed, burned or otherwise destroyed.
average per median per
case (grams) case (grams)
narcotics (e.g., heroin) 334 68
marijuana 21,853 1009
dangerous drugs 324 dosage units 268 dosage units
(e.g., LSD)
Hearings, supra note 114, at 234, 236, 238.
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In light of the constitutional right to bear arms and the widespread
ownership of firearms, the existence of weapons at the site of the search
could never establish the certainty of resistance. Even possession of
illegal weapons, by itself, would not meet the necessary level of prob-
ability. Many police searches are routinely made of locations that con-
tain weapons, legal and illegal, without meeting resistance. Only where
the existence of weapons is accompanied by a clear intent to resist arrest
could a no-knock entry be authorized.
Location: If evidence can be shown to be located where disposal
would be quick and easy, an intent to destroy is probable.118 However,
the difficulty of ever establishing standards of how near to a potential
instrument of disposal the evidence must be to find a positive intent to
destroy mitigates against sole reliance on location for the establishment
of probable cause for no-knock. Further, the time which elapses be-
tween the report of location and the execution of the silent entrance
determines the weight which ought to be given to this piece of evidence;
that is, when a substantial period elapses between the observation of
location and execution, the evidence ought to have little probative
value. This is especially true in narcotics offenses, where the drugs may
be quickly distributed or consumed. 919
Ordinarily probable cause for a search requires a showing that there
is reason to believe the object of the search is at the location. 20 But
with probable cause for no-knock, a shift in location of a few feet within
the dwelling can negate a previous inference that destruction is in-
The quantity of drugs directly influences the granting of no-knock warrants under the
1970 Drug Act. Such a warrant can be granted only in cases "relating to offenses involv-
ing controlled dangerous substances the penalty for which is imprisonment for more than
one year .... " § 509(b), 1970 Drug Act. Possession, which involves a relatively small
amount of drugs, by a person with no prior criminal record carries a penalty of less
than one year. Drug Act § 404(a). Gearing no-knock warrants to only some drug offenses
(those with penalties over one year) creates difficulties, because it will often be only after
arrest that determination of the offense will be made. Possession with intent to manufac-
ture, distribute or dispense is punishable by up to five years, § 401(b)(1)(B), simple posses-
sion by less than one year, § 501(e). The difference between the two is largely based on the
quantity seized. See testimony of John E. Ingersoll before Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile
Delinquency, Oct. 20, 1969, Hearings, supra note 114, at 673, 678. Also the length of penalty
may depend on 1) the age of the distributor of drugs, 2) the age of the distributee-recipient,
and 3) the difference in their ages-all facts often not known to the narcotics agents until
after arrest. The no-knock provision of the 1969 Drug Bill thus asks that a determination
of the offense be made prior to the search on the basis of knowledge that is very unlikely
to be in the agent's possession at that time.
118. Narcotics have been known to be kept resting on a toilet bowl, ready to be
flushed quickly down the drain. Bookmaking slips made of gelatin have been kept next
to a pot of hot water which can rapidly dissolve them. HALL, KAMIsAR, LAFAVE AND ISRAEL,
MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 272 (3d ed. 1969).
119. For an account of police investigation of narcotics suppliers' methods of operations,
see SKOLNICK, supra note 104, at 151.
120. Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth
Amendment, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664, 687 (1961).
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tended. Thus the lack of specificity in time of this information will
usually prevent the drawing of any accurate inferences from the loca-
tion of the evidence. 21 Also the informer will often not be able to dis-
close accurately the location of the drugs, which occupy a small space
and may often be kept hidden to prevent theft or foil informers. Any
information about their location is therefore highly susceptible to
fabrication or formation on the basis of general knowledge.
Given these difficulties in the specificity of informers' information,
and the need for a high probability of accuracy, independent police
corroboration will often be required. Under Spinelli and Aquilar v.
Texas122 it is appropriate "to require independent corroboration of
a part of the informant's story where the authorities have provided a
benefit of some kind ... in exchange for his information.' ' 23 But the
material facts which justify no-knock will be difficult to verify indepen-
dently, since the police will have little opportunity to check that evi-
dence themselves. 24 To establish probable cause for no-knock, the
corroboration should relate to the informer's statements about the
suspect's plans to frustrate the arrest or search. Given the need for
corroboration and given the difficulty of specific corroboration of the
evidence of resistance or destruction of evidence, informers' statements
will seldom by themselves fulfill Spinelli's requirements as a basis for
probable cause.
On-the-scene police observations: In certain carefully delineated situa-
tions, on-the-scene observations by the executing officers could establish
by themselves a virtually positive showing that evidence was going to be
destroyed, the search or arrest resisted, or escape attempted, were
entrance preceded by announcement. These situations will be consid-
ered below in the discussion of the role of the executing officer.
Summary: The only evidence that, standing alone, could usually meet
the probable cause test for exceptions to announcement is unequivocal
observations of the suspect's behavior by law officers at the scene of the
search. 25 The other potential sources of evidence should not by them-
121. For a similar conclusion about assuming that a criminal offense will continue
indefinitely, see People v. Wright, 367 Mich. 611, 116 N.W.2d 786 (1962); People v.
Siemieniec, 368 Mich. 405, 118 N.W.2d 430 (1962). See also Distefano v. United States,
58 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1932).
122. 378 U.S. 108 (1964). Under Aquilar the facts underlying the informant's conclusions
must be made known to the officer and magistrate making the probable cause decisions.
123. The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, supra note 110, at 181.
124. There is a question about what type of detail-innocuous detail or facts material
to the probable cause showing-must be corroborated. See, e.g., Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959) and Smith v. United States, 358 F.2d 833, 838 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
125. See pp. 170-71 infra.
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selves establish the requisite high probability of frustration of the
search or arrest. Police experience with certain classes of offenders, past
behavior of the suspect, and the type of drug or weapon present will
usually add little to the specific showing necessary to a probable cause
finding, although the type of evidence may show that destruction is
feasible. The expressed intent of the suspect, his past behavior in reac-
tion to police entrances, the quantity of evidence and its location have
greater probative value. In combination, any of these categories may
produce in certain cases a "virtually certain" demonstration that evi-
dence will be destroyed, the entrance resisted or an escape attempted.
Thus, combinations of categories of evidence, if also meeting the
Spinelli standards of reliability for informers' statements, in limited
situations may establish the degree of probable cause demanded for
exceptions to announcement.
B. Who Decides Probable Cause
A judicial officer should make most initial decisions about the rea-
sonableness of the use of no-knock authority, since the Fourth Amend-
ment requires judicial supervision of most other searches and seizures
to protect Fourth Amendment values.' 2 6 In principle, judicial super-
126, In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967), the Court said:
The constitution requires that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial
officer be interposed between the citizen and the police. Over and over again this
Court has emphasized that the mandate of the Fourth Amendment requires adherence
to judicial processes and that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.
These exceptions to judicial supervision-consent searches, wiretaps, searches of moving
vehicles and searches incident to arrest-are supported by reasoning which is inapplicable
to abrogation of announcement. In a consent search, of course, notice of identity and pur-
pose are always present in the police request for consent to search. Cf. Bumper v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). The search of a moving vehicle involves notice in that the
policeman's authority is manifest in his initial stopping of the vehicle and driver. See, e.g.,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Furthermore, the suspect will be aware of the
police entrance into his car even if it is not preceded by a statement, since the officer will
be in full view. A search of this nature is not nearly as great an affront to personal dignity
as the unannounced entry into a home or office. Also, the right of a car-owner to use vio-
lence to protect his car from intrusion is far less than that of a homeowner, so the like-
lihood of violence is proportionately less. It has been contended that since the public is
legally subject to wiretaps, which are unannounced, other unannounced searches should be
accepted with equanimity by courts and public. Sonnenreich and Ebner, supra note 2, at
618. The distinction is that wiretaps present a situation where it is not possible or
probable, but certain, that evidence will be destroyed if notice is given, since no con-
versations of investigative significance will take place on the tapped phone. As the
Supreme Court said in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355 note 16 (1967):
A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an intended
search. But if Osborn [Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966)] had been told
in advance that federal officers intended to record his conversations, the point of
making such recordings would obviously have been lost; the evidence in question could
not have been obtained. In omitting any requirement of advance notice, the federal
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vision is desirable; but, since a judicial officer will, in practice, always be
distant from the projected entry, it will be exceedingly difficult for him
to make a finding that will satisfy the need for high probability and
specificity as to person, place and time. This is particularly true since
the circumstances that justify no-knock are premised on transitory
events subject to momentary change.12 7 This time problem can be met
by severely limiting the duration of the no-knock warrant. The shorter
the interval between issuance and execution of the warrant, the greater
the chance of accuracy in the prediction of the suspect's behavior.
128
However, with specificity and high probability as guides, judicial
officers will be able to reach a finding of probable cause for the no-knock
exceptions on only a few occasions when certain types of evidence ap-
pear in combination. 29 Moreover, strict review of magisterial decisions
is necessary to insure the important constitutional values of announce-
ment.130 Detailed supervision must occur since the initial findings of
probable cause by judicial officers may often be no more than a rubber
stamp acceptance of police contentions.' 3 '
Despite the difficulties in establishing high levels of specificity at
judicial proceedings, discussed above, the basic authority to author-
ize silent entry must rest with the judicial officer. In certain in-
stances previously unknown facts may be directly observed by police at
the scene of the search which would permit no-knock in the absence of
a warranty. 82 Police ought never have the authority to decide to enter
unannounced solely on the basis of prior information; such authority
court that authorized electronic surveillance in Osborn simply recognized, as has
this Court, that officers need not announce their purpose before conducting an other.
wise authorized search if such an announcement would provoke the escape of the
suspect or the destruction of critical evidence.
Searches incident to arrest are signified by the arrest itself, which is subject to the same
notice requirements as a search in most jurisdictions.
127. See, e.g., pp. 165-68 supra.
128. Abbreviation of the warrant's duration, however, could not affect the degree of
uncertainty produced by the lapse of time between the gathering of the evidence and the
application for the search warrant.
129. Thus a cumulation of evidence has, on occasion, created the "positive" showing
necessary to authorize execution of a search warrant at night. See United States v. West,
328 F.2d 16 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Plemmons, 222 F. Supp. 853 (D. Tenn. 1965),
aff'd 336 F.2d 731 (6th Cir. 1964). See also pp. 162-69 supra.
130. Cf. Weed v. United States, 340 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1965).
131. A study has shown that even where there is formal judicial supervision of war-
rants that permit forcible entry (with announcement) "[b]ecause of the way in which
warrants are issued, there is no meaningful judicial review of the decision .. " LAFAvE,
ARRasr 45 (1965). "jJ]udicial officers tend not to take the prior review of a decision as
seriously as they do when a motion to suppress is made during subsequent litigation."
TIFFANY, MCINTYRE AND R OTENBERO, DETECTION OF CRIME 201 (1967). See also Note, Metro-
politan Criminal Courts of the First Instance, 70 HAv. L. REv. 320, 327 (1956).
132. Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), where the Court limited the scope
of search incident to arrest to the area within direct observation by officer and suspect
at time of arrest.
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would completely bypass the vital screening process to be performed by
the judiciary. Further, when they receive new information that is not
based on on-the-scene observation, like informants' statements, police
should not have discretion to evaluate it by themselves.
33
The probable cause decision for the first two of Justice Brennan's
exceptions-where police purpose and identity are known and where
someone within is in imminent danger-must necessarily be made
on the basis of on-the-scene knowledge, since police could rarely be
aware that their presence was known or that someone was in danger un-
til arrival at the scene. 134 Similarly, a direct observation by police on the
scene could, by itself, establish the high probability that evidence was
going to be destroyed, the search resisted or escape attempted. For ex-
ample, where police observe the door barricaded and a gambling
operation in progress, an intent to frustrate the entrance is dearly fore-
seeable. 13 5 This requirement of direct observation is strongly implied
by Justice Brennan in Ker as necessary to insure the particularity of an
exceptional entry,8 6 and the second segment of California's De Santiago
test is similar.3 7 However, such instances of on-the-scene observation
of facts indicating destruction of evidence or resistance to arrest will
be rare.
38
138. See p. 169 supra. Thus if an informer told police on patrol near the suspect's
home that the suspect intended to destroy evidence upon entrance, because this evidence
is not direct observation and has dangers of unreliability the police should not decide to
use no-knock without judicial approval.
134. It would be a rare occurrence when police could be certain their purpose and
identity were known to the suspect until they actually approached the scene. See pp.
157-58 supra. Similarly, it would be difficult to surmise that a person is in imminent dan-
ger before hearing cries or observing an assault at the location of the search or arrest.
These two exceptions, therefore, cannot be made grounds for silent entry by the police
until they become aware of suspicious activity by the suspects at the time of search.
135. People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
136. Applying this reasoning to the facts in Ker, Justice Brennan said:
T]he minimal conditions for the application of that exception are not present in
this case. On the uncontradicted record, not only were the Kers completely unaware of
the officer's presence, but again on the uncontradicted record, there was absolutely no
activity within the apartment to justify the officers in the belief that anyone within
was attempting to destroy the evidence.
374 U.S. at 61.
137. [W]hen officers prior to entry are able to detect activity from within which leads
them to reasonably conclude that the occupants are then engaged in the destruction
or concealment of evidence, an unannounced entry would be justified.
71 Cal. 2d at 29, 76 Cal. Rptr. at 812, 453 P.2d at 860. In fact, the two cases on which
California's exceptions to the rule of announcement were built, and gradually expanded,
involved behavior by suspects at the time of search which the police on the scene could
reasonably interpret as attempts to frustrate the arrest. In People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d
755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955), officers had observed from the outside that the door was barri-
caded, before opening the window, identifying themselves and entering. In Maddox po-
lice had knocked, though not identified themselves, when they heard a voice asking them
to wait followed by the sound of retreating footsteps. At this point, where they might
have had some reason to suspect that Maddox was about to destroy evidence, they en-
tered without further identification.
138. Police guidelines, detailing the circumstances justifying an officer's on-the-scene
171
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 80: 139, 1970
V. No-Knock Legislation Evaluated
Both the D.C. Criminal Procedure Act'3 9 and the 1970 Drug Act140
empower law enforcement officers, under certain circumstances, to
break into offices and homes without knocking, or giving their identity
or purpose. The two pieces of legislation provide that no-knock searches
may be authorized by warrants carrying a special no-knock clause.' 4 '
The law enforcement officers must thus apply to a judge or magistrate
and show probable cause for the inclusion of the no-knock permis-
sion.142 In the 1970 Drug Act, the authority to determine probable
cause is vested solely in the judge or magistrate. 143 The D.C. Criminal
Procedure Act makes the judge the first line of supervision, but in
addition vests discretion in the executing officer where there is no war-
rant or where, in the case of a warrant without no-knock, new circum-
stances become known at time of execution.
14
The situations that permit no-knock fall within Justice Brennan's
list of exceptions. The D.C. Criminal Procedure Act authorizes un-
announced entry "upon probable cause to believe such notice is likely
decision to use no-knock, could be developed and enforced to insure that such decisions
are consonant with the probable cause standards discussed above. See note 151 infra. It
may be contended that on-the-scene police discretion opens the door to abuse through
fabrication of facts that will justify unannounced entry. But concern solely for on-the-
scene discretion may be misdirected. Facts on the scene wil be more difficult to fabricate
than facts justifying a search warrant, since the kinds of information which police may
obtain, outside the dwelling, are simply much more limited than the kinds of information
which may be concocted by an eager informer.
139. D.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-522(c)(2), 23-591(c)(2). The granting of no-knock powers to
police marks a sharp departure from the common law in the District of Columbia, which
allowed no exceptions to the announcement rule. The leading District of Columbia case
on announcement is Accarino v. United States, 179 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1949). In extensive
dicta Judge Prettyman presented an historical account of the announcement rule, con-
cluding that "there is no division of opinion among the learned authors ...upon the
proposition that even where an officer may have power to break open a door without a
warrant, he cannot lawfully do so unless he first notifies the occupants as to the purpose
of his demand for entry." Id. at 462. Despite the fact that this statement was unnecessary
for the decision, Judge Prettyman's treatment of the common law became the basis for
subsequent District of Columbia interpretations of the announcement rule. The District
of Columbia courts have been sparing in the exceptions they have permitted to Accarino's
unbending call for announcement. See, e.g., Woods v. United States, 240 F.2d 237 (D.C. Cir.
1959) (opinion by Burger, J.); Keiningham v. United States, 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir 1960)
(entrance through unlocked door is entry without permission within the meaning of com-
mon law); Hair v. United States, 289 F.2d 894 (D.C. Cir. 1961). There is a question whether
these decisions were followed in practice. See, e.g., Washington Post, Sept. 26, 1970, at BI-
B2, col. 6.
140. 1970 Drug Act § 509(b).
141. 1970 Drug Act § 509(b); D.C. Code Ann. §§ 23-521(f)(6), 23-522(c)(2). The 1970
Drug Act provides no-knock only for execution of search warrants. The D.C. Criminal
Procedure Act authorizes it for execution of search and arrest warrants as well as war-
rantless searches and arrests. § 23-591(c)(2).
142. 1970 Drug Act § 509(b); D.C. Code Ann. § 23-522(f)(2).
143. There is no reason, though, why the agents should not also retain the common
law power of no-knock as interpreted by Miller and Ker. If circumstances at the time of
search necessitated, they could use this power to make a silent entry.
144. D.C. Code Ann. § 23-591(c)(2).
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to result" in destruction of evidence, resistance or escape, or if purpose
and identity are known.145 The 1970 Drug Act authorizes no-knock
upon "probable cause to believe that ... if such notice is given" the
evidence "will" be destroyed or the safety of the executing officer or
another "will" be endangered. 146 In the abstract, these probable cause
definitions do not negate constitutional guarantees; the fundamental
issue is their administration.
The evidentiary requirements deemed necessary to satisfy these de-
finitions of probable cause may not meet the requirements of specificity
and high probability. It is possible that general police experience with
classes of crimes will justify no-knock under these probable cause defini-
tions. Certainly the bare language of the provisions does not rule out
this possibility, for with some offenses it may be more probable than not
that evidence will be destroyed. The legislative history of the D.C.
Criminal Procedure Act makes it at least arguable that police experi-
ence with a general class of crime is enough to get a no-knock warrant
for any search or arrest involving the given offense. 147 On the other
hand, the legislative history of the 1970 Drug Act in the Senate indi-
cates that "it is not enough just to show that the particular substance
which is being sought is of such nature that it could easily be de-
stroyed .... 92148
145. D.C. Code Ann. § 23-591(c)(2) authorizes no-knock
[u]pon probable cause to believe (a) such notice is likely to result in the evidence sub-
ject to seizure being easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, (b) such notice is
likely to endanger the life or safety of the officer or another person, (c) such notice
is likely to enable the party to be arrested to escape, or (d) such notice would be a
useless gesture.
There are two levels where this probable cause determination may be made. A judge or
magistrate in the District of Columbia may include a no-knock direction of a search or
arrest warrant under conditions (a), (b) or (d) above. § 23-522(c)(2). A police officer may
choose to use no-knock on the basis of facts discovered at the scene of the search or arrest
if conditions (a), (b), (c), or (d) prevail. § 23-591(c)(2). The "useless gesture" referred to in
(d) means only announcement when purpose and identity are known. See CONG. Co r .
REP. ON DisTRIr OF COLUM. COURT REFORRM AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE Aar or 1970, H.R.
REP. 1303, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1970).
146. § 509(b) of the 1970 Drug Act authorizes no-knock entry when the judge or
magistrate has
probable cause to believe that (A) the property sought may and, if such notice is
given will, be easily and quickly destroyed or disposed of, or (B) the giving of such
notice will immediately endanger the life or safety of the executing officer or another
person ....
147. The House of Representatives Committee on the District of Columbia, which
originated the Act's language, explidtly followed Justice Clark's opinion in Ker, which
it interpreted as upholding "no-knock authorization ... based wholly on the general ex-
perience of the police officers .... H.R. REt'. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 106. But see
the conference committee report, intending that "the no-knock provision of the conference
bill shall not be bound by relevant and conflicting statements if any, contained in H.R.
REP. No. 91-907 and S. REP. 91-538." Co-,e%. OF CoNFERENcE, DSTRICr OF CoLum. CouRT
RFORf AND CRIMINAL PROCEURE AcT OF 1970, H.R. REP. No. 1303, 91st Cong. 2d Sess.
148. 116 CONG. REG. § 694 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1970) (remarks of Senators Tydings and
Griffin).
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It is fairly certain that both pieces of legislation unless severely
restricted will countenance probable cause found by any one of the
following kinds of evidence: 1) past convictions of suspect; 2) past
behavior in response to police entries; and informers' statements about
3) type, 4) location, and 5) quantity of evidence; or 6) an expressed
intent to destroy evidence or frustrate the search. The sponsor of the
1969 Drug Bill, Senator Dodd, after emphasizing that general police
experience with drug traffickers would not constitute probable cause,
stated that "[i]nformation regarding the actual location of the drug, the
type and quantity, or the propensity of the subject to be violent"'149
would suffice. By allowing no-knock on a mere showing of a certain kind
of offense, or solely on information about location or type of drug, or
past behavior of the suspect, for example, the D.C. Criminal Procedure
Act and the 1970 Drug Act would endanger the Fourth Amendment
values of announcement1
50
Neither Act requires the warrant to be sharply limited in duration,
so as to be specific in time or place. Nor are the Acts cognizant of the
problems with different types of evidence going to probable cause and
with informers and thus of the need for strict judicial review of this
evidence. Also the D.C. Criminal Procedure Act, which gives the
executing officer discretion in new circumstances, does not delimit
those circumstances in which discretion is properly exercised.
Thus, though the statutory definitions of exceptions to announce-
ment are acceptable, the Acts' treatment of what constitutes prob-
able cause, and who makes that decision are not at all adequate. The
result will probably be the broad and frequent use of no-knock powers
when the suspect may not in fact be destroying evidence, resisting the
entry or trying to escape. The maintenance of the constitutional values
of announcement demands stringent probable cause requirements. Ad-
mittedly the approach suggested above would permit no-knock in only
very few instances. But the no-knock provisions of the 1970 Drug Act
and the D.C. Criminal Procedure Act should be interpreted in this way
if they are to be consistent with the constitutional requirements of the
Fourth Amendment's announcement rule.1r1
149. 116 CoNG. REG. § 588 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1970).
150. Compare discussion of evidence meeting this principle, pp. 162-68 supra.
151. This interpretation of the federal statutes, as with all exceptions to announcement,
would be enforced through use of the exclusionary rule. See p. 156 supra. Oaks, Study.
ing the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REv. 665 (1970), makes a
forceful argument that the exclusionary rule is a failure in directly deterring illegal
searches and seizures. The standard of probable cause and its application to evidence sug-
gested above can and should be enforced through any technique effective in deterring
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illegal police behavior. Oaks suggests an effective tort remedy against the offending officer
or his employer. Oaks, supra, at 717-18, 756. Such a tort remedy could be developed under
common law or section 1983 of the federal Civil Rights Act. See generally Foote, Tort
Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955); Sym-
posium, Police Tort Liability, 16 CLEvE.-MAR. L. REv. 397-454 (1967). Apart from tort ac-
tions, there is the possibility of administrative compensation for damage to doors caused
by an unnecessary no-knock entry, with the payment coming from police budgets. Cf.
policy in Washington, D.C. at note 66 supra.
Other alternatives include the development of guidelines for prosecutors and police de-
tailing the situations where no-knock is permitted. See, e.g., K. DAvis, DiscRETroNARY JUs-
TicE 188-90, 222-25 (1969). Such guidelines are particularly necessary for officers to decide
what on-the-scene circumstances warrant their independent use of no-knock, presently an
area of wide discretion. Reports could be filed about each no-knock entry, increasing its
visibility. It would necessarily follow that sanctions would be applied to officers or prose-
cutors who violated the guidelines. Obviously, these, and other, approaches have to be
much more fully explored and empirically tested before being put into practice. The ini
portant point is that once we recognize the need for stringent limitations on unannounced
entries by police, means must be found to enforce them effectively.
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